University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2021

Capacity Investment And Market Power In The Electricity Market
Bo Cheng
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Economics Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and Energy Commons

Recommended Citation
Cheng, Bo, "Capacity Investment And Market Power In The Electricity Market" (2021). Publicly Accessible
Penn Dissertations. 5016.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/5016

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/5016
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Capacity Investment And Market Power In The Electricity Market
Abstract
This paper evaluates the effects of market power on capacity investment when firms are increasing
electricity generation capacity. Chapter 1 develops a model of capacity investments in the electricity
market and analyzes how investment incentives are affected by market power. Incentives for capacity
investment depend on the distribution of demand. Each level of demand affects overall incentives
differently depending on market power. Higher demand hours generate scarcity rent and significantly
contribute to the overall incentive for investment. However, this incentive is lower for firms with a higher
share of preexisting capacity. During demand levels when firms are not producing at capacity, additional
capacity can increase or decrease profits. Under certain scenarios, when profits decrease from additional
capacity, this decrease is stronger for competitive firms relative to firms with market power. Electricity
markets can introduce price caps and capacity payments as measures to mitigate market power and
provide adequate investment incentives. However, under these mechanisms, firms with market power can
behave strategically either to increase capacity payments or to limit entry. Chapter 2 presents an
empirical analysis of capacity investment and market power using data from ERCOT. I solve for
investment costs using techniques developed by Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007). I then test investment
levels under different market power scenarios. When firms are investing strategically, market power in the
electricity generation market does not significantly affect capacity investment. This is because the
incentive for capacity investment comes primarily from the scarcity rent during extreme-peak hours when
electricity prices exceed \$500 per MWh. During these hours, firms will produce at capacity regardless of
market power. During non-extreme-peak hours, firms with market power are able to stabilize prices more
effectively when capacity increases. This means that price decreases from capacity investments during
non-extreme-peak hours are less harmful to firms with market power. This may result in firms from the
competitive market investing at a slightly lower level relative to firms with market power. Results from
both chapters show that total welfare increases as the investment level increases.
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ABSTRACT
CAPACITY INVESTMENT AND MARKET POWER IN THE ELECTRICITY
MARKET
Bo Cheng
Arthur van Benthem
This paper evaluates the effects of market power on capacity investment when firms are
increasing electricity generation capacity. Chapter 1 develops a model of capacity investments in the electricity market and analyzes how investment incentives are affected by market power. Incentives for capacity investment depend on the distribution of demand. Each
level of demand affects overall incentives differently depending on market power. Higher
demand hours generate scarcity rent and significantly contribute to the overall incentive for
investment. However, this incentive is lower for firms with a higher share of preexisting capacity. During demand levels when firms are not producing at capacity, additional capacity
can increase or decrease profits. Under certain scenarios, when profits decrease from additional capacity, this decrease is stronger for competitive firms relative to firms with market
power. Electricity markets can introduce price caps and capacity payments as measures to
mitigate market power and provide adequate investment incentives. However, under these
mechanisms, firms with market power can behave strategically either to increase capacity
payments or to limit entry. Chapter 2 presents an empirical analysis of capacity investment
and market power using data from ERCOT. I solve for investment costs using techniques
developed by Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007). I then test investment levels under different market power scenarios. When firms are investing strategically, market power in
the electricity generation market does not significantly affect capacity investment. This is
because the incentive for capacity investment comes primarily from the scarcity rent during
extreme-peak hours when electricity prices exceed $500 per MWh. During these hours,
firms will produce at capacity regardless of market power. During non-extreme-peak hours,

v

firms with market power are able to stabilize prices more effectively when capacity increases.
This means that price decreases from capacity investments during non-extreme-peak hours
are less harmful to firms with market power. This may result in firms from the competitive
market investing at a slightly lower level relative to firms with market power. Results from
both chapters show that total welfare increases as the investment level increases.
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CHAPTER 1 : A Model of Capacity Investment and Market Power in
the Electricity Market
1.1. Introduction
Electricity regulators are concerned with sufficient incentives for firms to invest in generation
capacity and maintain resource adequacy. Some regulators choose to increase investment
incentives by implementing an energy-only market with no price caps.1 This type of market
allows firms to obtain substantial scarcity rents during hours when demand is very high, and
the regulators hope that these scarcity rents will incentivize additional capacity investments.
A second type of market mechanism to increase investment incentives is a capacity market
where firms are compensated for having targeted levels of capacity set by the regulators.
When regulators set price caps for the sale of electricity, they will implement a capacity
market to create additional incentives for capacity investments.
Investment decisions for firms are influenced by their ability to exercise market power. The
ability for firms to exercise market power and behave strategically will change the total
investment outcome in the market from the competitive scenario and lead to less efficient
outcomes. This can take place both in an energy-only market as well as in a market with
a price cap and capacity market.
The goal of this chapter is to identify the main sources of market power when firms are
investing in capacity and to evaluate how market power can decrease investment and welfare.
My analysis uses a model where firms produce electricity and make investment decisions
in the electricity market under various market power scenarios. In this model, I look at
the incentives for firms to make additional capacity investments by comparing the benefits
from additional capacity to its costs. Additional capacity will impact a firm’s profit in three
1

Energy-only markets refer to electricity markets without a separate capacity market. Investment incentives in the markets come from scarcity rent during high demand hours. Energy-only markets are likely to
have high or no price caps in order to maintain high scarcity rents for investment incentives.

1

ways: increasing total quantity sold, decreasing market price, and decreasing average cost.
The magnitude and direction of each of these effects will be different depending on the level
of demand and market power in the market.
Market power in the electricity market can occur both in the energy market and in the
investment market. Firms can exercise market power in the energy market by withholding
electricity production. Firms can also exercise market power in the investment market by
withholding investment. When firms are investing strategically, they take into consideration
the effects of additional capacity on their future profits in the energy market. I model
market power in the electricity market by comparing a monopoly electricity market and
a competitive electricity market. For the investment market, I will not model market
power explicitly, but show the optimal strategies for each firm and scenarios where strategic
behavior results in underinvestment. The ability for firms to behave strategically in the
investment market will largely depend on the existence of entrants into the market.
The main contribution of this chapter is to show the incentives for firms to make investments
under different levels of demand and market power scenarios. The overall incentive for
capacity investment for each firm is based on the actual distribution of hourly demand over
the lifetime of the investment. However, rather than focusing on the aggregate investment
incentives for each firm across all hours, which is ultimately an empirical question, I will
analyze the effects of additional capacity separately for two different levels of demand: peak
and off-peak. This is because the emphasis of this study is on the interaction between market
power and capacity investment incentives, and these two levels of demand are sufficient to
show the different cases for how market power affects capacity investment incentives.
I define peak demand as the demand level when both the demand curve and the marginal
revenue curve cross the supply curve at capacity. This occurs when demand is very high.
During peak demand, firms will produce at capacity regardless of the level of market power
in the energy market. The incentive for capacity investment for each firm comes primarily from peak demand hours as additional capacity will allow the firms to produce more

2

electricity and still sell at a high price. However, I show that this incentive for additional
capacity investment is different between incumbent firms and entrants. Incumbent firms are
incentivized to withhold investment in order to limit total market capacity. Markets with
entrants will have a higher level of total investment, and the highest level of investment
comes from a market where there are many small entrants. This is because entrants are
less concerned about the drop in energy market price from additional capacity as they do
not have preexisting shares.
I define off-peak demand as the demand level when both the demand curve and the marginal
revenue curve cross the supply curve below capacity. This is a lower level of demand
and occurs much more frequently than peak demand. During these hours, firms are not
capacity-constrained. Additional capacity can benefit firms by lowering their average costs
but can also decrease profits by lowering market prices. The net effect depends on market
conditions such as the level of off-peak demand, but the effects on profits will now also
depend on market power in the energy market. During these hours, firms with market
power will withhold production to increase prices and profits. In scenarios where firms in a
competitive market see revenue decreases from additional capacity, firms with market power
will see a smaller revenue decrease as they are able to maintain higher prices.
There is also a level of demand between peak and off-peak demand. During these hours
the demand curve crosses the supply curve at capacity, but the marginal revenue curve
crosses the supply curve below capacity. During these hours, a competitive energy market
is incentivized to invest in more capacity while a monopoly market does not have incentives
to invest in additional capacity.
Total welfare depends on market power in the energy market and also on the levels of additional capacity investment. Holding market power in the energy market fixed, additional
investment up to the socially optimal level will increase total welfare. Capacity investment
is maximized in a market where firms cannot behave strategically in the investment market.
This can be a market with a large number of incumbent firms or entrants. The highest level
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of welfare is achieved in a market where firms are behaving competitively in the energy
market and do not withhold investment in the investment market.
When price caps are introduced into the market, investment behaviors for firms will change
depending on the level of the price cap. When the price cap is set lower to reduce market
power, firms will decrease their capacity investments because scarcity rents from peak demand has decreased. Price caps can also cause excess demand that leads to blackouts during
hours when demand is high. To prevent blackouts and ensure a certain level of capacity in
the market, regulators can implement a capacity market and compensate the firms for the
reduction in scarcity rents under the price cap. However, firms with market power can also
take advantage of the capacity market to increase capacity prices or to limit new entry and
maintain market power in the energy market.
This paper builds on the existing literature on the theoretical treatment of capacity incentives and market power. Joskow and Tirole (2007) create a theoretical framework for
analyzing capacity incentives, price caps, and market power. Hogan et al. (2005) show how
an energy-only market can provide sufficient investment incentives. Bushnell et al. (2017)
provide a survey of major concerns and discussions surrounding capacity incentives. Fabra
(2018) captures the interaction between investment incentives and market power. McRae
and Wolak (2019) and Teirilä et al. (2017) provide empirical evidence for firms using the
capacity market to better their positions in the energy market. The contribution of this
paper is twofold. First, I show that how investment incentives interact with market power
depends on the level of demand. Second, I show the differential effect of market power in
the energy market and market power in the investment market on investment incentives
and highlight the role of entry in reducing the effects of market power.
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows: Sections 2 and 3 will motivate and define the
primitives of the model. Sections 4 through 7 will analyze the interaction of market power
and investment incentives under the three levels of demand. Section 8 shows the welfare
effects of underinvestment and finds the market power scenario with the highest level of
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welfare. Sections 9 and 10 analyze the effects of price caps and highlight certain strategic
behaviors for firms when a capacity market is implemented.

1.2. Primitives of the Model
In my model of the electricity market, there exists an initial set of firms with a preexisting
endowment of generation capacity adding up to K MW. I refer to these firms as preexisting
firms or incumbent firms. These firms already have capacity in the market, but they can also
increase their capacity by making additional investments. There is another set of firms that
do not have preexisting capacity but can enter the market by making capacity investments.
I refer to these firms as entrants.
Firms with generation capacity can make profits in the electricity market. The level of
profits in the electricity market will depend on demand and the cost of generation. When
firms decide to increase their capacity, they will also have to pay an investment cost for
each unit of additional capacity. Firms will be incentivized to increase their capacity if the
marginal increase in revenue for each additional unit of capacity is higher than the marginal
cost for adding, and producing with, that unit of capacity. In my model, I allow each firm
to make a one-time capacity investment simultaneously.
The incentive for firms to invest in additional capacity is determined by many factors. These
include, for each firm, its marginal generation cost per MWh, investment cost, whether it
is an incumbent or entrant firm, the level of investment by its competitors, and the level
of demand. In this model, all the firms make their capacity investments simultaneously.
The equilibrium investment outcome requires that each firm is investing at its optimal level
given that all other firms are also investing at their optimal levels.
In this analysis, I am primarily interested in the interaction between investment incentives
and market power. Therefore, I will look at investment incentives and outcomes under
varying market power and demand scenarios, while keeping marginal cost functions and
investment cost functions more or less constant. In many parts of the analysis, I will look
5

at investment incentives facing individual firms without solving for the market equilibrium.
This will provide a clear view for the different types of incentives facing firms individually.
In other parts of the analysis I will solve for (symmetric) equilibrium outcomes at the market
level. This will show how the overall level of capacity investment in the market changes
across different market power scenarios.
The hourly demand for electricity is linear: Q = a − bP . The marginal cost of producing
electricity for the entire market increases linearly with quantity, M C = cQ + d. The
upward sloping marginal cost function captures the increase in marginal cost as electricity
production increases. The slope of the marginal cost curve will also help to illustrate the
effects of capacity investments on cost and revenue during off-peak hours. The marginal
cost curve increases linearly with quantity up to capacity K, then the marginal cost function
becomes vertical. Each firm i can make a one-time capacity investment to increase their
capacity by xi , and the new capacity will have a constant marginal cost d for generating
electricity, which is the lowest available marginal cost technology. The assumption that d
is the lowest marginal cost technology will not affect major results in this analysis. The
magnitude of d does have an effect on potential cost reductions from new investment. This
will be discussed in detail in section 5.2.
In reality, the marginal cost curve is a step function where the marginal cost for each plant
is constant up to capacity. Equilibrium quantity changes when the demand curve crosses a
lower section of the marginal cost curve as it shifts to the right with new capacity. Instead
of using a step function, I capture this change in quantity with the slope parameter in my
marginal cost function. This allows me to model any change in equilibrium quantity with
a linear function between the previous quantity and the new quantity. The slope can be
thought of as representing the average change in marginal cost for any equilibrium quantity
change.
I denote the share of preexisting capacity K for each firm with the parameter δi . When
δi is small for all i, this means that there are many small incumbent firms in the energy
6

market. When δi is large for a smaller number of firms, this means that the energy market
is more concentrated.
0

The investment cost for investing in xi additional capacity is Ii (xi ), where Ii (xi ) > 0
00

and Ii (xi ) ≥ 0. Investment cost increases in xi , and the marginal investment cost also
increases in xi . I assume also that this investment cost function is adjusted to be the
average investment cost per hour over the lifetime of the plant. This formulation allows
for a direct comparison between hourly demand and hourly investment cost. In parts of
the analysis, I will specify that all the firms have the same investment cost function. This
will allow for cross firm comparisons. In other parts of the analysis, I will also specify
firms to have a constant marginal investment cost function. This specification allows for
the comparison of firms investing at different levels.
Where appropriate, I will also introduce a fringe entrant with an investment cost function
of the same form as regular firms, If (xf ). However, this fringe entrant is not a single firm,
but a continuum of small individual entrants ordered from lowest to highest cost. The total
cost of investing xf for the continuum of fringe firms is If (xf ), and the investment cost for
0

the next fringe firm after xf fringe firms have already invested is If (xf ).
In certain sections of the analysis, such as finding the market with the highest total welfare, I
will need to consider the investment cost for the market as a whole. I denote the investment
cost function for the market as I(x), where x is the total capacity investment in the market.
I(x) combines the investment cost functions of all firms with the potential to make capacity
investments with the criteria that investments with the lowest cost will be constructed first.

1.3. Optimal Investment, Demand, and Motivation
When firms make capacity investments, they pay an upfront investment cost. This upfront
cost is offset by the profits from each hour, t, over the lifetime of the plant, T . Therefore,
the total cost of the investment is T ×Ii (xi ), where Ii (xi ) is the amortized cost of investment
per hour. When firms are making their one time investment simultaneously, the profit from
7

investing in xi additional capacity for firm i can be represented by:

Πi (xi ) =

T
X

[pt (qt ; xi , x−i ) × qti (xi , x−i ) − Ci (qti ; xi )] − T × Ii (xi ).

(1.1)

t=1

I do not have discounting in this model because all of the subsequent analysis is at the
hourly level when the firm compares its current hourly profits against an hourly amortized
investment cost. Profit from each hour contributes to the overall incentive for capacity
investment. During certain hours, such as high demand hours with scarcity rent, additional
capacity will be highly profitable. Therefore, these hours provide a strong incentive for
additional capacity. However, it is also possible during some hours that additional capacity
will not increase profit, and may even decrease profit by reducing price. The total incentive
for capacity investment is the summation of profits from all these hours.
Previous studies on capacity investment incentives mainly focus on hours with scarcity
rent. This is because these hours are highly lucrative and provide the main source of
investment incentives for firms. However, the effect from additional capacity on lower
demand hour profits will also contribute to investment incentives. In order to capture
investment incentives determined by different levels of demand, I define two levels demand
in this chapter. Peak demand is when the demand curve and the marginal revenue curve are
both crossing the supply curve at capacity. Off-peak demand is when the demand curve and
the marginal revenue curve are both crossing the supply curve below capacity. These two
levels of demand are not sufficient to capture the total continuous distribution of all possible
levels of demand. However, they are able to capture the various qualitative patterns for the
interactions between investment incentives and market power.
By reducing the distribution of demand into two levels, I define Pr(Peak) as the probability
that a given hour is a peak demand hour. I focus my analysis on extreme cases when
Pr(Peak) = 1 and Pr(Peak) = 0. I begin my analysis in Section 4 by providing an exposition
on investment incentives for firms when Pr(Peak) = 1. This essentially means the firms
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face only peak demand. My goal for this section is to show the investment incentives facing
each firm and how these incentives are affected by market power. In Section 5, I solve
the equilibrium investment outcome in the market under various market power scenarios
when Pr(Peak) = 1. This implicitly assumes that the effect of additional capacity on profit
during off-peak hours is zero. This is not a realistic assumption, but the market equilibrium
based only on peak hours is a good proxy and forms a good basis for thinking about how
off-peak hours can change this equilibrium. Section 6 provides an exposition on the various
ways off-peak hours can increase or decrease overall investment incentives and how these
incentives change with market power. In this analysis, I test the change in profits when
Pr(Peak) = 0 as capacity increases. In section 8, I solve for the welfare-maximizing level of
investment and provide a simulation showing investment and welfare outcomes for various
market power scenarios under different distributions of peak and off-peak hours. This
concludes my analysis for energy-only markets. In sections 9 and 10, I provide an analysis
of market power under price caps and capacity markets.

1.4. Incentives for Capacity Investment During Peak Demand
In this section, I provide an exposition of incentives for capacity investment when Pr(Peak)
= 1. My objective in this section is not to solve for equilibrium investment outcomes or
to consider the total investment incentives from the distribution of all hours. Instead, my
objective is to examine the sources of investment incentives during peak hours and show how
these incentives interact with market power both in the energy market and the investment
market. It is useful to understand investment incentives from peak hours because these
hours are highly lucrative and provide the primary source of investment incentives for firms.
I define peak demand as the hours when both the demand curve and the marginal revenue
curve cross the supply curve at capacity. I will further define that during these hours both
the marginal revenue curve and the demand curve will cross the supply curve at capacity
even after significant capacity investment. Figure 1 show an illustration of peak hour
demand. Empirically, these hours do not occur frequently, but the incentives for capacity
9

Figure 1: Peak Hour Demand

investment for each firm come primarily from the high scarcity rent generated during these
hours.
When Pr(Peak) = 1, under all market power scenarios, firms will produce at capacity in
the energy market. However, firms with high shares of preexisting capacity K will be more
concerned about drops in price from additional capacity because the lower price will affect
the profits from all of their preexisting capacities in the market. Firms with fewer or no
shares of preexisting capacity will also care about price decreases in the energy market. This
is especially the case if these firms are making substantial capacity investments. However,
for these firms, the lower price will only affect the new units. For firms with no preexisting
shares, a drop in price will mean smaller profits from its new investments, but for firms
with high preexisting shares, a drop in price will also mean a decrease in profits from all
existing capacity.
Fringe entrants making small investments will not be concerned about decreases in energy
market prices as long as the price is high enough to offset the cost of entry for each individual
unit. Therefore, markets with fringe entrants will result in the highest level of capacity
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investment.

1.4.1. Investment Incentives for Individual Firms without Fringe Entrants
First, we will consider markets without fringe entrants. When Pr(Peak) = 1, the market
is producing at capacity, the hourly revenue for the entire market is the market clearing
price multiplied by the total market capacity. Prior to new capacity investments, the total
market capacity is K, so the market revenue is given by R = K( a−K
b ). For each preexisting
firm i prior to new investments, define δi as its share of total capacity K, then the revenue
for each firm i prior to any new investments is Ri = δi K( a−K
b ).
Let xi denote capacity investments from firm i, and let x−i denote capacity investments from
all other firms. After these investments, the new capacity for firm i increases to δi K + xi ,
and the new total market capacity increases to K + x−i + xi . When δi = 0, this represents
a firm without preexisting shares that is entering the market as a entrant. The capacity for
an entrant firm i will be zero before the new investments and xi after the new investments.
Under peak demand, by assumption firms are all still producing at capacity after capacity
investments. The hourly revenue for firm i is its total capacity, δi K + xi , multiplied by the
new market-clearing price. The new price is determined by where demand crosses the new
capacity level in the market given by K + x−i + xi .


Ri = (δi K + xi )

a − K − x−i − xi
b


(1.2)

Taking the derivative w.r.t. xi , we get the change in revenue for each firm for the next unit
of capacity investment:

dRi
1
δi K
= (a − K − x−i − 2xi ) −
dxi
b
b

(1.3)

The first thing to note is that the marginal revenue for additional capacity is lower for firms
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with higher shares of preexisting capacity δi K. This means that for firms with preexisting
capacity, the next unit of investment is worth less relative to firms without preexisting
capacity. This is because the drop in price from additional capacity decreases profits from
the firm’s preexisting shares but does not affect firms without preexisting shares. Marginal
revenue for firm i is also lower if the total capacity in the market is high, either if the
preexisting capacity K is high or if investments by other firms x−i are high. This is because
higher total capacity in the market will lower the market price, which will lower the revenue
for the next unit of capacity investment by firm i.
Marginal revenue for additional capacity also decreases with the firm’s own investment level
xi and will become negative once investment reaches this limit:

1
xi > (a − K − x−i − δi K)
2

(1.4)

The value of xi that satisfies Equation 1.4 is not the optimal level of investment for firm i,
because the optimal investment level will depend on the total distribution of demand and
on investment cost. Instead, xi represents the investment level that will maximize revenue
when Pr(Peak) = 1. Investment is maximal when x−i and δi are both zero. This is for a
firm without preexisting capacity in a market where there are no capacity investments from
other firms. This implies that when Pr(Peak) = 1, a firm without preexisting capacity in
a market without investments from other firms is incentivized to invest at a higher level
relative to other types of firms. The value 21 (a − K) denotes an upper limit for how much
a firm can increase their capacity before revenue starts to decrease during peak demand
under all market power scenarios. This means that regardless of market power scenario
or differences in costs, no firm will find it profitable if their capacity investment increases
beyond 12 (a − K).
Investment incentives for each firm also depend on marginal cost of electricity generation
and capacity investment cost for the additional units. New capacity investments have the
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lowest marginal cost technology d by assumption. For a given peak hour, the investment
level that optimizes profits during this hour equates marginal revenue from this capacity
investment to marginal cost plus marginal investment cost. Therefore, the investment level
that optimizes peak hour profit for each firm is given by:

δi K
1
0
(a − K − x−i − 2x∗i ) −
= d + Ii (x∗i )
b
b

(1.5)

Again, x∗i is not the optimal investment level for firm i, for that depends on the total
distribution of demand levels. Here, x∗i represents the incentive for investment from demand
during peak hours, and this incentive changes depending on the market concentration of
capacity.
After rearranging, we get the investment level that optimizes peak hour profits for each firm
in this following form:
Proposition 1. When Pr(Peak) = 1, the investment level that optimizes profits for each
firm decreases as its share of preexisting capacity increases. That is, x∗i increases as δi
decreases.

Proof. After rearranging Equation 1.5, we get this following form:

1
1 0
x∗i + bIi (x∗i ) = (a − K − x−i − δi K − bd)
2
2

(1.6)

The LHS of the equation strictly increases with x∗i and the RHS of the equation strictly
decreases with δi . When δi increases, the LHS of the equation must decrease, which implies
a lower x∗i .
If we hold investment cost to be the same for all firms, then the difference in investment
incentives among firms is determined by their shares of preexisting capacity. I must empha-
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size here that this difference is not due to each firm’s ability to exercise market power in the
energy market. This is because all firms are producing at capacity under peak demand by
construction. Rather, preexisting capacity decreases investment incentives when Pr(Peak)
= 1 because additional capacity will decrease market price, and this lower market price will
lower profits from each firm’s preexisting capacity. Firms with lower shares or no shares
of preexisting capacity are less concerned about this decrease in profits from preexisting
capacity relative to firms with higher shares of preexisting capacity.
Proposition 1 shows the source of how market power interacts with investment incentives
when Pr(Peak) = 1. For each firm, its incentives to invest depend on its share of preexisting capacity. This leads to an interesting conclusion that from peak hours, entrants have a
higher incentive to invest relative to incumbent firms. However, in this section by focusing
on the perspective of individual firms, we still cannot say much here about equilibrium
outcomes for the entire market. I will shift my focus to the market level and solve for equilibrium outcomes in the next section, after the following analysis on investment incentives
for fringe entrants.

1.4.2. Investment Incentives with Fringe Entrants
Firms without preexisting capacity have a higher marginal revenue with respect to capacity
investment relative to incumbent firms. However, these entrants still have an incentive
to limit their capacity investments because given that they have already made xi units of
capacity investment, every additional unit of capacity will decrease the market price and
reduce profits for the original xi investment. This incentive to limit capacity investment
is stronger in markets where the entrants are large relative to a market with many small
entrants.
I claim here that for markets with many smaller entrants, there is less incentive to limit
investment. I model the market with many small entrants as a continuum of fringe entrants.
The investment cost increases for every additional unit of fringe investment and is given by
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0

If (xf ), where xf is the total level of investment already from the fringe.
For each firm f in the fringe continuum, let xf denote the investment level from the fringe
continuum from all other fringe firms with investment costs below f . This means that when
f invests, xf will have already invested from the fringe continuum. Then the revenue for f
for its unit of investment is given by:

1
Rf = (a − K − x−i − xf ).
b

(1.7)

Firms in the fringe will invest in the next 1 MW of capacity if the revenue from the one unit
of investment offsets the costs. Fringe firms will continue to enter until the revenue from
the next unit equals the costs of that unit. Since each firm in the fringe is only concerned
with its own unit of investment, its marginal revenue with respect to additional capacity
is higher than firms with preexisting shares or larger entrants. This leads to the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. Suppose that aggregate investment cost function of the fringe is the same
as the investment cost function for an incumbent firm, that is If (x) = Ii (x) for all x. Then
when Pr(Peak) = 1, the continuum of fringe entrants as a whole will have a higher level of
investment incentives relative to incumbent firms or larger entrants.

Proof. The aggregate marginal revenue for the fringe can be represented as the revenue for
the unit of investment for the next fringe firm. We can compare this with the marginal
revenue for the next unit of investment for an incumbent or non-fringe entrant. Holding
their respective investment levels to be the same, that is xf = xi , we have the following
inequality:

1
1
(a − K − x−i − xf ) > (a − K − δi K − x−i − 2xi ).
b
b
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(1.8)

The LHS of the inequality is the marginal increase in revenue with respect to additional
capacity for each fringe firm. This is always higher than the RHS of the inequality which
is the marginal increase in revenue with respect to additional capacity for incumbent firms
or non-fringe entrants. Let x∗i denote the investment level that optimizes peak hour profits
for the firm on the RHS of the inequality, then this firm will not have an incentive to invest
more than x∗i when Pr(Peak) = 1.
For the firm on the RHS, at x∗i , its marginal increase in revenue with respect to additional
capacity is equal to its marginal increase in costs. However, since the fringe and the firm
on the RHS of the inequality have the same investment cost function, we have this result:

1
1
0
(a − K − x−i − x∗i ) > (a − K − δi K − x−i − 2x∗i ) = d + If (x∗i ).
b
b

(1.9)

This inequality shows that at x∗i , the incumbent or non-fringe entrant does not have an
incentive to invest in more capacity. However, the next unit of fringe entrant still finds it
profitable to enter the market. This is because for this fringe entrant its revenue for the
next unit of investment is higher than the cost.

Intuitively, the fringe has a higher level of investment incentive because each additional unit
supplied by a fringe firm is only valued at the revenue of that one unit. This is not the
case for incumbent firms or non-fringe entrants because they are also concerned about the
decrease in market price that will affect their preexisting shares or other units of investment.
In reality there are additional barriers to entry for smaller firms so they will not completely
deter larger firms from entry. Nevertheless, the presence of fringe firms will significantly
reduce the ability for other firms to behave strategically in the investment market. I show
this and other equilibrium results in the next section.
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1.5. Peak Hour Equilibrium Investment and Market Power
In this section, I solve for equilibrium investment outcomes in the market under various
market power scenarios by assuming that firms base their investment decisions only on peak
hour demand, that is Pr(Peak) = 1. This assumption contradicts my previous statement
that the optimal level of investment for each firm depends on the distribution of all levels
of demand. However, I have three reasons for proceeding from this assumption. First, this
assumption simplifies the analysis and makes it possible to solve for equilibrium results
analytically. Second, results from this assumption extend nicely to previous studies on
market power and capacity investment because they tend to focus on the role of scarcity
rent. In this section I essentially analyze the role of scarcity rent on investment by expanding
to a richer set of market power scenarios. Third, the equilibrium results based on Pr(Peak) =
1 provide a good proxy for total investment level and form a good baseline for understanding
the relationship between investment outcomes and market power. By assuming that firms
base their investment decisions only on peak hour demand, I am also implicitly assuming
that the incentive for firms to invest from off-peak hours is zero. I show with a simulation in
the next section that firms will invest in little or no additional capacity when only off-peak
hours are considered (Pr(Peak) = 0). While the incentive for investment from off-peak hours
is not absolutely zero, the primary incentive for investment comes from peak hours. The
additional incentive from off-peak hours is not enough to generate substantial investment
outcomes on its own, but will create slight deviations from the Pr(Peak) = 1 equilibrium
outcome. Therefore, it is useful to understand equilibrium outcomes based only on peak
hour demand as a starting point, and then see how this equilibrium can deviate based on
lower demand hours in the next section.
In this model, depending on the market power scenario, there exist incumbent firms and
also potential entrants. All firms will make a one-time capacity investment simultaneously.
Each firm will choose the investment level that optimizes its profit. Equilibrium requires
that all firms are investing optimally given the investment levels of their competitors. To
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further simplify the analysis, I will assume that the firms are all identical and solve for
symmetric equilibria under various market power scenarios.
When Pr(Peak) = 1, market power in the energy market does not affect investment decisions. This is because firms in the energy market will all produce at capacity regardless of
their market power. Differences in capacity investment outcomes can only result from firms
behaving strategically in the investment market. The ability of firms to behave strategically
depends on the number of incumbent firms and the number of entrants in the investment
market.
I will show the equilibrium outcome for total investment from the following scenarios: N
identical incumbent firms with no entrants, N identical entrants with no investment from
incumbent firms, a mixture of incumbent firms and entrants, and total investment level for
a market with small fringe entrants. I will show that for markets without entrants, total
investment increases as the number of incumbent firms increases. Investment will be higher
when there are entrants and will increase as the number of entrants increases. The highest
level of investment will result from a market with individual fringe entrants.

1.5.1. Incumbent Firms
First will be the case with N identical incumbent firms with no entrants. Solving for a
symmetric equilibrium based on Equation 1.6, we get that the equilibrium investment level
for each firm is:

x∗I =

1
2



K
0
a − K − (N − 1)x∗I −
− bd − bIi (x∗I )
N

(1.10)

x∗I denotes the symmetric equilibrium investment level for each firm in this market with N
incumbent firms and no entrants. We can solve for x∗I and multiply by N to get the total
equilibrium investment level in the market:
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N x∗I =


N 
0
a − bd − bIi (x∗I ) − K
N +1

(1.11)

Proposition 3. For a market with N identical incumbent firms with no entrants, the
equilibrium investment level increases as the number of incumbent firms increases.
Proof. Contrary to the proposition, suppose N x∗I were not to increase. This implies the
RHS of Equation 1.11 does not increase. Given

N
N +1

increases with N , then the term in

parentheses must decrease, which, by the convexity of Ii (x∗I ), implies x∗I must increase. However, a necessary condition for N x∗I to not increase is that x∗I decreases. This contradiction
shows that N x∗I is increasing in N .

1.5.2. Entrants
For the market with N identical entrants and no investment from incumbent firms, the
total equilibrium investment level is calculated similarly. Let x∗N E denote the symmetric
equilibrium investment level for each entrant, the total equilibrium investment level in this
market is given by:

N x∗N E =


N
N 
0
a − bd − bIi (x∗N E ) −
K
N +1
N +1

(1.12)

Proposition 4. A market with N identical entrants and no investment from incumbent
firms will have a higher equilibrium investment level compared to a market with N incumbent
firms making investments without any entrants.2
Proof. I will prove Proposition 4 by contradiction. For a given N , suppose x∗N E ≤ x∗I . This
2
In this scenario where N entrants are investing with no investment from incumbent firms, it is not always
the case that total investment will increase with N . This is due to the NN+1 K increasing as N increases.
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implies that N x∗N E ≤ N x∗I and therefore


N
N 
N 
0
0
a − bd − bIi (x∗N E ) −
K≤
a − bd − bIi (x∗I ) − K.
N +1
N +1
N +1

However, since N x∗N E ≤ N x∗I , we have through the investment cost function that


 

0
0
a − bd − bIi (x∗N E ) ≥ a − bd − bIi (x∗I ) . We also have that

N
N +1 K

≤ K. Both of these

conditions lead to a contradiction to the above inequality.3

1.5.3. A Mixture of Incumbents and Entrants
Thus far, we know that a market with N incumbent firms will increase total investment
level as the number of firms increases. We also know that a market with N entrants will
result in a higher level of investment relative to a market with N incumbent firms. Now, I
want to show the total investment outcome for a mixture of entrants and incumbent firms.
Proposition 5. For a market with L firms making capacity investments, let N denote the
number of incumbent firms and M denote the number of entrants, the investment level in
the market increases as M increases. This means that for a market with a fixed number of
firms making investments, total investment will be higher in a market with a higher share
of entrants.

Proof. I will prove Proposition 5 by induction. In step 1, I will show that a market with
N incumbents and 1 entrant have a higher level of investment relative to a market with
N + 1 incumbents and no entrants. Then in step 2, I will show that a market with N
incumbents and M entrants have a higher level of investment relative to a market with
N + 1 incumbents and M − 1 entrants.
Step 1. There are N + 1 number of firms in both markets. First isolate the N incumbent
firms from the 1 remaining firm. This 1 remaining firm is an incumbent firm in one market
3

The difference in investment level between the two markets is slightly below

increase in marginal investment costs

0

Ii (x∗N E )

−

0

Ii (x∗I ).
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K
N +1

if we include the

and an entrant in another. I will denote this 1 remaining firm as firm S. Firm S is an
incumbent firm in the market with all incumbent firms and an entrant in the other market.
Let Y denote the optimal level of investment for firm S. Suppose for now that we fix the
investment level from the N incumbent firms in both markets. We know from Equation 1.4
that the entrant firm S has a higher optimal investment level than the incumbent firm S.
This means that, if we hold the investment from the N incumbent firms to be the same in
both markets, Y will be higher in the market with one entrant relative to the market with
all incumbents.
However, in equilibrium, the investment from the N incumbent firms will not be the same
between the two markets if Y differs in the two markets. The equilibrium investment level
from the N incumbents will be lower when firm S is an entrant. Now, we need to make
sure that when Y increases, the equilibrium investment level from the N incumbents will
decrease by a smaller amount. This will show that for any increase in investment level for
firm S as it switches from an incumbent to an entrant, the equilibrium investment level
from the remaining N will decrease by a smaller amount, thus the total investment level in
the entire market will increase.
For any given investment level by firm S, denoted by Y , the optimal level of investment for
the other N incumbent firms is:

x∗I

1
=
2


a − K − (N −

1)x∗I

K
0
−
− bd − bIi (x∗I ) − Y
N



This implies that the equilibrium investment outcome for the N firms for any given level of
Y is:

N x∗I =


N 
N
0
a − bd − bIi (x∗I ) − K −
Y
N +1
N +1

We can see for any increase in Y , the equilibrium quantity from the N incumbent firms will
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decrease by

N
N +1 Y

, which is smaller than Y . This completes the proof for step 1.

Step 2. In one market, there are N + 1 incumbent firms and M − 1 entrants. In the other
market, there are N incumbent firms and M entrants. We need to show that the market
with M entrants has a higher level of investment in equilibrium. Let us hold M − 1 entrants
in both markets in isolation and first look at the remaining N + 1 firms. If we assume that
the M − 1 entrants in both markets have the same investment level, then by Step 1, we
already know that for the remaining N + 1 firms, the market with N incumbents and 1
entrant will have a higher investment level than the market with N + 1 incumbents.
Again, denote the investment level by the N + 1 remaining firms by Y . We already know
that if the M − 1 entrants in both markets have the same investment level, then Y will be
higher in the market with one remaining entrant. We also know that in equilibrium, the
investment level for the M − 1 entrants will not be the same in both markets if Y differs in
the two markets. We have to make sure that for any increase in Y from the N + 1 firms,
the decrease in investment from the M − 1 entrants will be less than Y .
For any given investment level by the N + 1 firms, denoted by Y , the optimal level of
investment for the other M − 1 entrants is:

x∗I =


1
0
a − K − (N − 1)x∗I − bd − bIi (x∗I ) − Y
2

This implies that the equilibrium investment outcome for the M − 1 entrants for any given
level of Y is:

N x∗I =


N 
N
0
a − bd − K − bIi (x∗I ) −
Y
N +1
N +1

Again, for any increase in Y , the equilibrium quantity from the M − 1 entrants will decrease
by

N
N +1 Y

, which is smaller than Y . This means that for a fixed number of firms making
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investments, the total investment level in the market will increase if a higher share of these
firms are entrants.

1.5.4. Fringe Entrants
Finally, we consider the case when the entrants are small firms forming the fringe continuum.
Starting from Equation 1.7, we can derive the investment level for the fringe as:

0

x∗f = a − K − x−i − bd − bIf (x∗f )

(1.13)

0

If we assume that the marginal investment cost function If (x∗f ) is relatively constant, we can
see that there is almost a one-to-one relationship between investment from other firms and
investment from the fringe. Under this assumption, the fringe investment xf will increase
by one unit for a one unit decrease in investment from other firms, x−i . This means that if
the market has many smaller entrants, then any strategic behavior in the investment market
to reduce investment will be mitigated by the fringe. In fact, if we assume that x−i = 0 in
Equation 1.13, the optimal level of investment for the fringe is equivalent to the equilibrium
outcome in Equations 1.11 and 1.12 as N approaches infinity. This means that a market
with only fringe firms making investments is equivalent to a market with only incumbents
or non-fringe entrants making investments as the number of those larger firms approach
infinity.4
However, if the marginal investment cost function is steeply upward-sloping, then the fringe
is not as effective at mitigating strategic behavior by larger firms. When other firms withhold
investment, the fringe may not increase its investment because the additional units are too
costly. This problem worsens if the fringe has a much higher investment cost function than
4
It is possible that in markets with fringe entrants, larger firms will also make investments. For example,
consider a market with fringe entrants and also one other large entrant i. Using Equations 1.6 and 1.13, we
0
0
can derive the optimal investment level for the non-fringe entrant in equilibrium as x∗i = b(If (x∗f ) − Ii (x∗i )).
The investment from the non-fringe entrant is zero only if the marginal investment cost function is constant.
Following the proof for Proposition 6, we can see that markets where non-fringe firms and fringe firms are
all investing will result in an even higher level of investment relative to a market where only fringe firms are
investing.
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other firms. This is because with higher investment costs the fringe will invest at an even
lower level. If investment costs for the fringe are exceedingly high, then the fringe will invest
in little or no capacity.
Proposition 6. Suppose in a market there are N incumbent firms and M entrants with the
same investment cost function. If a fringe with the same investment cost function replaces
one of the M + N firms, then capacity investment in the market will increase.

Proof. Without loss of generality, let the fringe replace one of the N incumbent firms.
Denote this firm as Firm S. When Firm S is replaced by the fringe continuum, the investment
level from the fringe will be higher than Firm S. This is because the investment incentive
for the fringe is given by Equation 1.13, and the investment incentive for Firm S is given by
Equation 1.6. When facing the same investment level x−i from the N − 1 firms, the fringe
will always invest more than Firm S.
By Step 1 in the proof for Proposition 5, the investment level for the N − 1 incumbent firms
plus the fringe continuum will increase. Then by Step 2 in the proof for Proposition 5, after
accounting for the remaining M entrants, the equilibrium investment level in the market
increases.

1.5.5. Summary for Peak Hour Investment Equilibrium
Figure 2 shows a simulation for total market investment levels across different market power
scenarios. The market with only incumbent firms investing in capacity has the lowest level
of capacity investment in the market. The market with only entrants has higher levels of
investment, and the market with a mixture of incumbent firms and entrants is in-between.
The market with a set of fringe firms has the highest level of investment. I will also show
in the welfare section that a market with fringe entrants will result in the highest level of
total welfare across all market power scenarios.
To summarize the main results from this section: In a market with N identical firms making
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Figure 2: Capacity Investment and Market Power Scenarios

Note: In the simulation, peak demand is constant with a = 200,000, b = 150, d = 20, and K = 50,000. Marginal
investment cost is held constant and normalized to one hour at $833. This is equivalent to an investment cost of
$1,000,000 per MW for a plant lasting 40 years with 30 peak hours per year. Variations in investment cost will not
change the resulting order from this simulation because all firms have the same investment cost.

capacity investments, the symmetric equilibrium outcome for the total investment level in
the market increases as N increases. Total investment level is higher for a market with N
firms making investments if a higher share of the N firms are entrants. If any of the N firms
is replaced by fringe suppliers, the investment level in the market will increase even more. It
is important to keep in mind that the strategic behavior by incumbent firms and non-fringe
entrants in this section is not due to their ability to withhold electricity production in the
energy market. By assumption, firms during peak hours all produce at capacity, and their
strategic behaviors in the investment market result from the effect of additional capacity on
future prices. In the next section, I will analyze off-peak hours where the ability to withhold
electricity production does have an effect on investment incentives.

1.6. Effects of Additional Capacity during Off-Peak Demand
In the previous section I focused on the behavior of firms when supply is constrained. In
those scenarios, firms are always producing at capacity, and market price is only determined
by the total capacity level in the market. I made the assumption that firms will always
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produce at capacity even after capacity investment. This assumption implies that during
those high demand hours there will be a one-to-one increase between capacity investment
and quantity sold. However, during hours with lower demand, the demand curve will cross
not the vertical but the upward sloping part of the marginal cost function and there will be
a much more gradual increase in quantity as capacity investment increases.
In this chapter, I define off-peak demand as any level of demand that crosses the supply curve
at the upward-sloping section. Unlike peak hours when all firms are producing at capacity,
during off-peak hours, firms with market power will withhold production to increase price.
Therefore, additional capacity will affect firms differently during these hours depending on
whether they have market power. This is especially the case if the off-peak demand curve
is crossing a steeper part of the supply. During these instances, additional capacity can
significantly decrease price in a competitive market, but firms with market power will be
able to keep prices high through strategic withholding.
In this section I provide an exposition on the various interactions between market power and
investment incentives during off-peak demand. My method is to analyze how hourly revenue
and electricity production costs increase or decrease with additional capacity when Pr(Peak)
= 0. Since total investment incentives depend on the distribution of all demand hours, if
profits increase during off-peak hours with an increase in capacity, I can say that off-peak
hours positively contribute to investment incentives and vice versa. These patterns provide
a direction for how the equilibrium outcomes from the previous section may deviate when
we include investment incentives from off-peak hours. To show the difference in off-peak
investment incentives based on market power, I compare the effects of additional capacity
between a competitive energy market and a monopoly energy market. The main emphasis
of this section is to show that additional capacity may decrease revenue for incumbent
firms, and when this occurs, the decrease in profit is more significant for the competitive
energy market. This is because the monopoly is able to maintain prices even when capacity
increases by withholding production. This means that the decrease in profits from these
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hours will disincentivize firms in a competitive market from capacity investments more
significantly relative to the monopoly market.
It is important to emphasize here that under the primitives of this model, equilibrium
quantity during off-peak hours will change if capacity increases. This may seem counter
intuitive because the firms are already not producing at capacity before investment. How
could additional capacity change equilibrium quantity when the firms are not using all of
their capacity in the first place? Additional investment will shift the marginal cost curve
further to the right so that the marginal cost curve will meet a lower point on the demand
curve. This point determines the quantity in the competitive energy market. The monopoly
energy market will produce at a lower level by setting quantity to where marginal revenue
crosses marginal cost. In both markets, the new equilibrium price and quantity will be at
a lower point on the demand curve as the marginal cost curve shifts right. This change in
the equilibrium quantity as the supply curve shifts to the right is shown in Figure 3.
The shift in the supply curve is specified by this adjustment to the marginal cost function:
M C = cQ+d−cx, where x is the total level of additional capacity investment in the market.
This change in the marginal cost function is due to all of the new capacity investments
having marginal cost d. In this model, I assume that new capacity investment has the lowest
marginal cost equal to d. This assumption allows the entire supply curve to shift from the
right as depicted in Figure 3 and results in the change in equilibrium quantity pre-and-post
investment. If this assumption does not hold and marginal cost for new capacity is higher,
then the equilibrium quantity pre-and-post investment may not change. If the marginal
cost for new capacity is higher than the off-peak equilibrium price pre-investment, then
additional capacity will shift the section of the supply curve to the right of the equilibrium
quantity, and in this case equilibrium quantity pre-and-post investment will not be affected
by the new investment and remain the same. For this analysis, I proceed by assuming that
all additional capacities have marginal cost d.
When the supply curve shifts to the right from additional capacity, the overall effect on

27

profit as equilibrium price and quantity change depends on three factors: first, the average
cost decreases because the newest units with the lowest marginal cost have replaced the
previous last-producing units with higher marginal costs. Second, quantity increases as
the marginal cost curve shifts right and meets a lower point on the demand curve. Third,
the market-clearing price also decreases due to the marginal cost curve meeting a lower
point on the demand curve. Lowering average cost and increasing quantity will affect profit
positively, but a lower price will negatively affect profit. Of these effects, the price effect is
likely to dominate. Intuitively, it is because the decrease in cost and increase in quantity
only affect the marginal units, but a decrease in price affects all the remaining quantity
uniformly.
In reality, during lower demand hours when demand or marginal revenue is crossing the
upward sloping section of the marginal cost curve, firms are unlikely to benefit from additional capacity. The savings in marginal cost in this model are based on my assumption
that new capacity has the lowest cost technology. Even under this assumption, the savings
are small and alone cannot justify the high investment costs, and higher costs from new
capacity will remove these savings altogether. The more significant effect is on revenue, additional capacity during lower demand hours usually decreases revenue due to the decrease
in equilibrium price. This factor actually disincentivizes firms from investing in capacity.
The magnitude of this effect differs between a competitive energy market and a monopoly
energy market. Unlike the previous section where firms in all market power scenarios are
producing at capacity, the monopoly in this case can withhold production to stabilize price
while firms in the competitive market will see a larger decrease in price. The following analysis looks at the effect of additional capacity on revenue and cost between the monopoly
and competitive markets when Pr(Peak) = 0, where demand crosses the upward sloping
part of supply below capacity.
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Figure 3: Competitive Equilibrium before and after Investment during Off-Peak Hours

1.6.1. Revenue Decreases for Incumbent Firms During Off-Peak Hours
This analysis focuses on the effects on revenue from additional capacity for incumbent
firms in a competitive market and a monopoly market. Unlike the previous section when
I analyzed individual competitive firms, in this section I will look at competitive profits as
a whole. The result from this approach can still be generalized to individual competitive
firms if we assume that their share of total profit is the same as their share of total capacity.
In the competitive market, when the market makes a capacity investment x, the new equilibrium quantity is determined by where the new marginal cost curve crosses the demand
curve. Figure 3 shows the change in equilibrium as the marginal cost curve shifts right from
the new investments. The new equilibrium quantity can be obtained by setting the price
equal to the marginal cost.

a−Q
= cQ + d − cx
b
Solving for Qc and Pc in the competitive market we get:
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(1.14)

a − bd
bcx
+
1 + cb 1 + cb




a 1 a − bd
1
bcx
Pc = −
−
b
b 1 + cb
b 1 + cb
Qc =

(1.15)
(1.16)

Differentiating revenue as a function of capacity increase we get:

 2 2

1
dRc
2
2 2
=
ab
c
−
abc
+
2b
cd
−
b
c
2x
dx
b(1 + cb)2

(1.17)

Overall, the sign of the derivative is ambiguous. If we look at the numerator, the direction
of the derivative depends mainly on the value of bc, the interaction of the slope parameters
for demand and marginal cost functions. When bc < 1, this implies that the slope of the
marginal cost curve is lower than the slope of the demand curve in absolute value. This
is likely the case in the electricity market, especially during lower demand hours when the
demand function is crossing the flatter part of the marginal cost curve to the left. Steeper
decreases in marginal cost only occur to the very right of the marginal cost curve when
demand is almost reaching capacity. When bc < 1, the first two terms together have a
negative value. If we consider a special case when d = 0, the third term becomes zero. In
this case when d = 0 and bc < 1, the direction of the derivative is negative for any value of
x. Under these circumstances, any additional capacity will reduce the total revenue for the
competitive market. The assumption that d = 0 is not realistic, but the value of a is usually
more than one order of magnitude larger than bd. This means that if bc < 0.9, it is very
likely that additional capacity will still reduce total revenue for the competitive market.
For the monopoly, quantity is determined by where the marginal revenue curve crosses the
marginal cost curve:

a − 2Q
= cQ + d − cx
b
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(1.18)

Solving for Qm and Pm for the monopoly we get:

a − bd
bcx
+
2 + cb 2 + cb




a 1 a − bd
1
bcx
= −
−
b
b 2 + cb
b 2 + cb
Qm =

Pm

(1.19)
(1.20)

Differentiating revenue for the monopoly with respect to increases in capacity we get:

 2 2

dRm
1
2
2 2
ab
c
+
2b
cd
−
b
c
2x
=
dx
b(2 + cb)2

(1.21)

In this case, the −abc term in the numerator for the competitive market does not exist for
the monopoly, which implies that the numerator for the monopoly will always be larger
than the competitive market. This means that the revenue for the competitive market will
start decreasing at a lower level of capacity investment x relative to the monopoly. Also,
for a level of x such that the derivatives for the competitive and the monopoly are both
negative, the magnitude for the monopoly will be lower than the competitive. This leads
to the main takeaway from this section.
Proposition 7. For any increase in capacity such that the revenue for the competitive
market will decrease, the revenue in a monopoly market will either increase, or decrease by
a smaller magnitude, relative to the competitive market.5
That is, for all x such that

dRc
dx

< 0, we have:
dRm
dRc
>
dx
dx

5

(1.22)

For cases when increases in capacity lead to an increase in revenue for the competitive, the monopoly
will also experience an increase in revenue. Comparing the numerator from Equations 1.17 and 1.21, the
numerator for the monopoly will be larger. Therefore, whenever the numerator is positive for the competitive,
it will also be positive for the monopoly. However, the denominator for the monopoly is also larger than
the denominator for the competitive. Therefore, when both numerators are positive, it is ambiguous which
market will experience a larger increase in revenue.

31

Proof. First, compare the numerator from Equations 1.17 and 1.21. The numerator for
the monopoly is always larger than the numerator for the competitive market. When the
numerator for the competitive market is negative the numerator for the monopoly could
be positive or negative. If the numerator for the monopoly is positive, then the positive
derivative for the monopoly is larger than the negative derivative of the competitive market.
If the numerator for the monopoly is negative, it is smaller in absolute value than the
numerator for the competitive market. Furthermore, the denominator for the monopoly is
larger than the denominator for the competitive market. Therefore, the derivative of the
monopoly is smaller in absolute value than the derivative for the competitive market, which
means that the negative value for the monopoly is closer to zero.

It is important to keep in mind that investment incentives for firms depend on the distribution of demand. Therefore, when revenues decrease as capacity increases for a certain
level of demand, then this level of demand negatively contributes to the overall incentive for
investment. Proposition 7 says that in terms of revenue, whenever an off-peak demand negatively incentivizes investment for a competitive market, the monopoly will always be less
negatively incentivized by this demand level. The reason for this is that the monopoly can
exercise its market power in the energy market by withholding production and keep prices
relatively higher than firms in the competitive market who are not withholding production.
Based on revenue alone, we can see that when Pr(Peak) = 0, the competitive market is
disincentivized from making additional capacity investment more than the monopoly.
Figure 4 is a simulation showing the changes in energy market revenue when Pr(Peak) = 0
between the competitive market and the monopoly market as additional capacity increases.
In this scenario, revenue for the monopoly increases slightly as capacity increases, but
revenue for the competitive market decreases with additional capacity. We can say that in
this case based on revenue, this off-peak demand hour contributes negatively to the overall
investment incentive for the competitive market, and contributes positively to the overall
investment incentive for the monopoly.
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Figure 4: Competitive and Monopoly Off-Peak Revenue Change

Note: This graph shows the percent change in energy market revenue between the competitive and the monopoly
markets as generation capacity increases. 100 on the y-axis refers to the revenue when capacity in the market is K =
50,000 MW. In the simulation, off-peak demand is constant with a = 20,000 and b = 150. Capacity before investment
is K = 50,000. Marginal cost parameters are d = 20 and c = 0.0004. The value of c corresponds to a $1 increase
in marginal cost per every 5,000 MWh. This corresponds to the flatter part of a typical supply curve where demand
crosses supply during most off-peak hours.

1.6.2. Comparison of Cost Reductions when Supply is Not Constrained
Firms can also invest to reduce their average cost as the new installed capacity has the
lowest marginal cost d. Again, I will focus on the entire competitive market as one firm.
Given the construction of the marginal cost function for each competitive firm, the reduction
of total cost will benefit each competitive firm based on their share of preexisting capacity.
When the competitive market increases capacity by x, the total cost of producing electricity
C can be calculated by combining the area of the rectangle with height d and width equal
to the new equilibrium quantity with the triangle above the rectangle. This is shown in
Figure 5 combining areas denoted as A and B. The length of triangle B is equal to the new
equilibrium quantity minus x and height is equal to c times the new equilibrium quantity
minus x:
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Figure 5: Total Cost During Off-Peak Hours after Investment
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(1.23)

Differentiating with respect to x we get the change in cost of producing electricity with
additional capacity:

b2 c2 d + 2bcd − ac + cx
dCc
=
.
dx
(1 + bc)2

(1.24)

Given that the constant term in the demand function, a, is generally very high, it is possible
that the cost decreases with additional capacity. If we again consider the case when d = 0,
then the cost of producing electricity will decrease for any x < a.
For the monopoly, we can use the same process but changing the quantity to where the
marginal revenue crosses the marginal cost:
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The change in cost with respect to x for the monopoly is:

dCm
b2 c2 d + 4bcd − 2ac + 4cx
=
.
dx
(2 + bc)2

(1.26)

Based on these equations, any directional differences between the monopoly and competitive
market are unclear and will depend on the parameters in the rest of the model. In reality,
the marginal cost curve in the electricity market usually has a higher slope when a higher
quantity is produced. Since the marginal revenue curve crosses the marginal cost curve
to the left of the demand curve, this means that the cost reduction is most likely higher
for the competitive firm relative to the monopoly. This is shown by the simulation in
Figure 6, where the competitive market experiences a greater decrease in cost relative to
the monopoly.
In terms of the overall effect on profit when Pr(Peak) = 0, the decrease in average cost can
offset some of the decrease in revenue as capacity increases. However, the decrease in cost
and the decrease in revenue are likely to cancel out the total effect on profit in the energy
market. The effect on profit when Pr(Peak) = 0 as capacity increases is shown in Figure 7.
In this scenario, profit for the competitive market stays relatively flat as capacity increases
while profit for the monopoly sees a slight increase.
These simulations show that profits in the energy market when Pr(Peak) = 0 will not
benefit much from additional capacity, and this is especially true for incumbent firms in
a competitive market. Figure 7 shows the hourly energy market profit when Pr(Peak) =
0 as capacity increases. During these hours, the profit for the monopoly far exceeds the
profit in the competitive market. We can also see that the profits for either market are not
increasing in any noticeable way. Once I normalize the profit at 0 additional capacity to
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Figure 6: Competitive and Monopoly Off-Peak Cost Change

Note: This graph shows the percent change in generation cost between the competitive and the monopoly markets as
generation capacity increases. 100 on the y-axis refers to the generation cost at equilibrium quantity when capacity in
the market is K = 50,000 MW. In the simulation, off-peak demand is constant with a = 20,000 and b = 150. Capacity
before investment is K = 50,000. Marginal cost parameters are d = 20 and c = 0.0004. The value of c corresponds
to a $1 increase in marginal cost per every 5,000 MWh. This corresponds to the flatter part of a typical supply curve
where demand crosses supply during most off-peak hours.

Figure 7: Competitive and Monopoly Off-Peak Profit

Note: This graph shows the energy market profit per off-peak hour between the competitive and the monopoly
markets as generation capacity increases. In the simulation, off-peak demand is constant with a = 20,000 and b =
150. Capacity before investment is K = 50,000. Marginal cost parameters are d = 20 and c = 0.0004. The value of c
corresponds to a $1 increase in marginal cost per every 5,000 MWh. This corresponds to the flatter part of a typical
supply curve where demand crosses supply during most off-peak hours.
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Figure 8: Competitive and Monopoly Off-Peak Profit Change

Note: This graph shows the percent change in energy market profit between the competitive and the monopoly
markets as generation capacity increases. 100 on the y-axis refers to the profit at equilibrium quantity when capacity
in the market is K = 50,000 MW. In the simulation, off-peak demand is constant with a = 20,000 and b = 150.
Capacity before investment is K = 50,000. Marginal cost parameters are d = 20 and c = 0.0004. The value of c
corresponds to a $1 increase in marginal cost per every 5,000 MWh. This corresponds to the flatter part of a typical
supply curve where demand crosses supply during most off-peak hours.

100, Figure 8 shows that the profit for the monopoly is increases slightly while the profit
for the competitive market decreases as capacity increases.
Furthermore, Figure 7 shows profit changes with capacity increases without factoring in the
cost of investment. If investment costs are factored in, then firms will see a net loss in total
profit from off-peak hours.
Once we factor in investment costs into the simulation in Figure 7, firms will see a net loss in
total profit when Pr(Peak) = 0. The main incentives for capacity investment will primarily
come from peak demand hours when the demand curve crosses the vertical part of the
marginal cost curve. What happens when we consider cases when there are a combination
of peak and off-peak hours? That is, when 0 < Pr(Peak) < 1. The simulation in Figure 9
shows the investment outcomes for a range of peak hours in a year from 0 to 100. Investment
levels increase as the number of peak hours increases in a year. We can see that when the
number of peak hours is zero, firms will not invest. This is because any changes in profit
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Figure 9: Capacity Investment and Peak Hours

Note: This graph shows the market investment level between the competitive and the monopoly markets as the
number of peak hours increase in a given year. The competitive market is investing strategically as a single firm, but
cannot withhold production in the energy market. In the simulation, off-peak demand is constant with a = 20,000
and b = 150 and peak demand is constant with a = 200,000 and b = 150. Capacity before investment is K = 50,000.
Marginal cost parameters are d = 20 and c = 0.0004. The value of c corresponds to a $1 increase in marginal cost
per every 5,000 MWh. This corresponds to the flatter part of a typical supply curve where demand crosses supply
during most off-peak hours. Investment cost function is 800000x + 400x2 . This corresponds to EIA’s investment cost
estimate of $1,000,000 per MW for a 650 MW plant.

(decreases or slight increases) from additional capacity when Pr(Peak) = 0 will not justify
the investment costs for the additional capacity. When the number of peak hours increases,
the scarcity rent from the peak hours provides the incentive to increase capacity. The
changes in profit from off-peak hours from additional capacity create slight deviations from
considering peak hours alone. If firms see an increase in profits from the additional capacity
during off-peak hours, they will invest slightly more from the peak-hour-only equilibrium.
And if firms see a decrease in off-peak profits, they will invest slightly less from the peakhour-only equilibrium.
In Figure 9, the competitive market and the monopoly are both investing strategically
as a single strategic firm in their markets. The only difference is that the monopoly can
withhold production in the energy market while the competitive cannot. Therefore, during
peak hours they both have the same incentive since neither markets are withholding. The
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difference in investment between the two markets is purely due to the difference in profits
from off-peak hours. We can see that in Figure 8, the monopoly benefits from additional
capacity, while competitive market sees a decrease in off-peak profits. This means that
off-peak hours positively contribute to the overall investment incentives for the monopoly
and negatively contribute to incentives for the competitive market. Therefore, when in
combination with incentives from peak hours, the monopoly has a slightly higher level of
investment. Section 8 analyzes welfare outcomes and provides a more detailed simulation
across a range of peak hours for various market power scenarios.

1.6.3. Entrants
When Pr(Peak) = 0, the incentives to invest facing entrants will be different from firms with
preexisting capacity. This is because capacity investment from entrants will have the lowest
marginal cost and therefore will likely produce at capacity even during off-peak demand.
Price in the energy market during these hours will be set by the monopoly in the monopoly
market and firms with higher marginal costs in the competitive market. These profits may
provide additional incentives for entrants to invest in capacity in combination with high
scarcity rents from peak hours. Profits for entrants during off-peak hours will be higher in
a market with market power and as a result there is a greater incentive from entrants to
invest into these markets.

1.7. Between Off-Peak and Peak Demand
In the previous sections I described the incentives for capacity investment during peak
and off-peak demand. During peak demand, both the demand curve and the marginal
revenue curve are crossing the vertical part of the marginal cost curve at capacity. Scarcity
rents during peak hours incentivize firms to invest in additional capacity. The difference
in capacity investment will depend on how much preexisting capacity each firm has. The
highest level of capacity investment will come from a market with small fringe entrants
without any preexisting shares of capacity. During off-peak demand, both the demand
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Figure 10: Between Off-Peak and Peak Demand

curve and the marginal revenue curve cross the upward sloping part of the marginal cost
curve below capacity. During these hours for the monopoly and any competitive firms
with preexisting shares, additional capacity can increase or decrease both revenue and cost.
However, I showed in the previous section that the magnitude of the total effect on profit is
likely to be small, making investment incentives from these hours insufficient for significant
investment levels without peak hours.
In this section I will analyze the hours when demand is between the two previous levels.
This is when the demand curve is crossing the vertical part of the marginal cost curve, but
the marginal revenue curve is crossing the upward sloping part of the marginal cost curve
to the left. This level of demand is illustrated in Figure 10. During these hours, the benefit
for the monopoly from additional capacity is the same as off-peak hours from the previous
section. This benefit is likely to be small or even negative, so the monopoly will not be
incentivized to invest more. However, since the demand curve still crosses the vertical part
of the marginal cost curve, these hours may provide another significant source of investment
incentives for the competitive market in addition to peak hours.
For the monopoly, the marginal revenue curve begins to cross the upward sloping part of
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the marginal cost curve when:

a − 2K
= cK + d
b

(1.27)

When this occurs, the demand curve will have a higher value at K and will cross the vertical
part of the marginal cost curve. In the competitive market, the increase in profit in the
energy market for firm i from additional capacity during these hours is:

dΠi
a − K − x−i − 2xi − δi K
=
−d
dxi
b

(1.28)

Additional capacity will benefit the competitive firms more than the monopoly when two
conditions hold. First, firm i will benefit from additional capacity as long as Equation
1.28 is positive. This means that the change in energy market profit during this hour from
additional capacity is positive. Second, since the marginal revenue curve no longer crosses
the vertical part of the marginal cost curve, the demand curve will also begin to cross
the upward sloping part of marginal cost curve with a certain level of additional capacity
investment. When this occurs, demand will fall into the off-peak level, and the benefit for
the competitive firm will become much smaller. This following proposition summarizes the
incentive for the competitive firm to invest during this level of demand.
Proposition 8. Based on the two conditions above, the competitive firm will benefit from
additional investment when xi satisfies these two equations:
a − K − x−i − 2xi − δi K
>d
b

and

a − K − x−i − xi
> cK + d
b

(1.29)

Proof. The inequality to the left is the investment level where profits for the competitive
market will increase. The inequality to the right is the investment level where this hour
becomes an off-peak hour. If investment level crosses either inequality, the competitive
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market will no longer benefit from additional capacity.

When demand satisfies the two equations above, additional investment is more beneficial to
the competitive firms relative to the monopoly. Profit increases for the competitive firms
from these hours will positively contribute to the overall investment incentive and make
additional capacity more attractive relative to just looking at peak hours. The change in
profit for each competitive firm will depend on its preexisting shares of capacity. Firms
with a higher share of preexisting capacity will experience lower profit. If there are a
significant number of hours when demand is in this range, then different market power
scenarios in the energy market will result in different levels of capacity investment. In that
case, it is possible that investment will be larger in the competitive market relative to the
monopoly. However, empirically the number of hours with this level of demand is low, and
investment incentives primarily come from peak demand hours. Therefore, I will omit these
hours for the remaining analysis and maintain the two levels of peak and off-peak demand.
For an analysis incorporating these in-between levels of demand, please see the subsequent
empirical chapter.
For entrants, hourly profits during these hours will be positive since the market price is
higher than marginal cost d. These profits provide additional incentives for entrants to
invest in capacity in combination with high scarcity rents from peak hours. Similar to the
analysis in the peak hour section, fringe entrants will have the highest incentives to invest
among all entrants.

1.8. The Investment Market with the Maximum Welfare
We have already seen that an investment market with entrants will result in a higher level
of investment relative to a market without entrants. A market with many small fringe
entrants will result in the highest level of investment. This section makes the argument
that, holding market power in the energy market constant, markets with higher levels of
investment will result in higher welfare, and the market with fringe entrants will have the
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highest level of welfare across all market power scenarios.
I begin this section by providing a proof that higher investments result in higher welfare
under both peak and off-peak demand. Then I present a numerical simulation that outputs
investment and welfare results under various market power scenarios combining peak and
off-peak hours. That is, I consider a range of peak hours in a given year from 0 to 100.
In these simulations, both peak and off-peak hours contribute to the profit changes from
investment. The differences in investment outcomes show how investment incentives differ
across various market power scenarios. The results from these simulations are consistent
with the proofs showing that given the same market power in the energy market, the
investment market that leads to the highest level of investment results in the highest level
of welfare.

1.8.1. Welfare Proofs
If we only consider the energy market, it is trivial to show that higher levels of new capacity
will result in higher total welfare. This is because as capacity increases and the marginal
cost curve shifts to the right, the area between the demand curve and the marginal cost
curve after the capacity investment will always encompass the area between the two curves
before the capacity investment. What is left to show is that even when we include the
investment costs, the additional investment costs from the additional capacity will not be
more than the increase in welfare from the energy market.
Let x denote the total equilibrium investment level for a given market. Assuming that the
investment costs are the same across different firms and different market power scenarios,
the only reason x can result in a lower welfare relative to a lower investment level, denoted
by xi , is if the increase in investment costs from xi to x is larger than the total welfare
increase from xi to x. We also know that the marginal profit increase in the energy market
from xi to x has to be larger than the investment costs from xi to x, otherwise the firms
will not make the additional investments. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that the profit
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Figure 11: Peak Hour Welfare Increase

increase from xi to x will always be smaller than the welfare increase from xi to x so welfare
will always increase more than investment costs.
First, I will make this argument when Pr(Peak)=1. Then I will make the same argument
when Pr(Peak)=0. When Pr(Peak)=1, demand and marginal revenue is crossing the vertical
part of the marginal cost function. The welfare increase can be broken up into three
geometric areas shown in the shaded regions in Figure 11. The first area is the parallelogram
with base equal to x and height equal to cK. The second area is the rectangle above
the parallelogram with width x and height from the top of the parallelogram to the new
equilibrium price. The third area is the triangle above the rectangle with width x and
height the difference in equilibrium price between the old and new capacity levels. Adding
all three areas we get that the increase in energy market welfare W is equal to:


W (x) = xcK + x




x a−K
a−K −x
a−K −x
− cK − d +
−
b
2
b
b

(1.30)

If we think of this as a market with only entrants, then the first two terms together is equal
to the total profit for the entrant in the energy market. This is already higher than the
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profit increases if the investment is made by incumbent firms. The third term makes the
increase in welfare always larger than the increase in profit for the entrant firms. Therefore,
during these hours markets with higher capacity will always result in higher welfare.
Proposition 9. When Pr(Peak)=1, the optimal level of investment from the social planner’s perspective is:
0

x∗ = a − K − bd − bI (x∗ )

(1.31)

Proof. When we differentiate Equation 1.30 with respect to x and set it equal to marginal
investment cost for the market, we can derive the optimal level of investment from the social
planner’s perspective for only considering peak hours.

a − K − 2x∗ x∗
dW (x)
0
=
+
− d = I (x∗ )
dx
b
b
We can obtain the optimal level of investment by setting the derivative to zero and solve
for x∗ .

When Pr(Peak)=1, the optimal level of investment from the social planner’s perspective
looks very similar to the market outcome with only fringe entrants in Equation 1.13. The
only difference here is that the investment costs function I(x) is for the whole market rather
than just the fringe. These two equations will equal each other if the fringe firms are the
only firms making investments in the market. If I(x) is lower than the fringe investment
cost function, then the optimal level of investment will be even higher than the market with
only fringe entrants.
When Pr(Peak)=0, demand or marginal revenue is crossing the upward sloping part of the
marginal cost function, the increase in welfare can be broken up into two areas shown in
Figure 12. The first area is the parallelogram with base equal to x and height equal to the
new equilibrium price P (K + x) minus d. The second area is the triangle above with base
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Figure 12: Off-Peak Hour Welfare Increase

equal to the difference between the new equilibrium quantity Q(K + x) and x and height
equal to the difference between the old equilibrium price P (K) and the new equilibrium
price. Notice that the area of the parallelogram is the same as the profit for the entrant in
the energy market xP (K + x), so welfare will always be larger than the firm’s profit by the
area of the triangle above. Similar to the argument above for peak hours, during off-peak
demand hours when the demand curve is crossing the marginal cost curve below capacity,
markets with higher capacity will also always result in higher welfare.6

1.8.2. Welfare Simulations
Thus far in this paper, with the exception of Figure 9, I have considered cases of peak-only
hours or off-peak-only hours. That is, when Pr(Peak)=1 or when Pr(Peak)=0. We now
move to a case under a distribution of peak and off-peak hours, where 0 < Pr(Peak) < 1.
6

Note: This argument for off-peak hours only applies when comparing welfare within a market as investment increases, but does not apply when comparing two markets with different market power in the energy
market. For example, if we analyze a monopoly market, we can say that if investment increases due to a
less strategic investment market, then welfare in this monopoly market will increase. However, we cannot
say that a less strategic investment market in this monopoly energy market will result in a higher level
welfare than a more strategic investment market in a competitive energy market. This is because although
the investment market is more competitive, the monopoly will still exercise market power during off-peak
hours, while the competitive market will not exercise market power in the energy market.
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Figure 13: Investment Simulation for Various Market Power Scenarios

Note: This graph shows the market investment level for six different markets as the number of peak hours in a year
increases from 0 to 100. In the simulation, firms make a one-time investment that lasts 20 years. Annual profit is
calculated as a summation of off-peak and peak hours. The three highest investment levels are for a monopoly energy
market with entrants making investment. The fourth highest level of investment is a competitive energy market
with a fringe entrant. Next is a duopoly market with no entrants, this market surpasses investment level in the
competitive market as the number of peak hours increases. The lowest level of investment is from a market with a
single monopoly firm making investments. In the simulation, off-peak demand is constant with a = 20,000 and b =
150, and peak demand is constant with a = 200,000 and b = 150. Capacity before investment is K = 50,000. Marginal
cost parameters are d = 20 and c = 0.0004. The value of c corresponds to a $1 increase in marginal cost per every
5,000 MWh. This corresponds to the flatter part of a typical supply curve where demand crosses supply during most
off-peak hours. Investment cost function is held constant for each market at 800000x + 400x2 . This corresponds to
EIA’s investment cost estimate of $1,000,000 per MW for a 650 MW plant.
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Figure 13 considers the investment outcomes under various market power scenarios for a
range of peak hours in a year from 0 to 100. This simulation combines the investment
incentives from peak and off-peak hours and shows the equilibrium investment level under
various market power scenarios. In this simulation, firms make a one-time investment
decision. The investment lasts 20 years and annual profits are calculated as a summation
of hourly off-peak and peak profits. The graph shows the changes in investment level
as the number of peak hours in a year increase from 0 to 100. First note that, in all
markets, investment increases as the number of peak hours increases. This is because
peak hours are extremely lucrative and significantly contribute to the overall incentive for
investment. The investment incentives from peak hours facing each market is relatively
similar, so the differences among markets is caused by off-peak hours. The three highest
levels of investment are in markets with a monopoly energy market with entrants. The
reason these three markets have the highest level of investment is because the monopoly
maintains a high market price during off-peak hours. Therefore, entrants in these three
markets have much higher additional income from off-peak hours relative to entrants from
the competitive market. The two markets that do not have entrants have lower investment
levels. This is because the monopoly or duopolies in these markets have large shares of
preexisting capacities, and they prefer to invest at a lower level in order to maintain higher
prices.
Table 1: Welfare from Competitive Case

Competitive + Fringe
Duopoly
Monopoly + Fringe
Monopoly + Two Entries
Monopoly + One Entry
Monopoly

0
100
89
81
78
75
70

Number of Peak Hours
20
40
60
80 100
100 100 100 100 100
91
92
93
93
94
84
87
89
90
92
82
85
87
89
91
78
81
83
84
86
74
78
80
82
84

Note: This table shows the welfare outcomes from the investment simulation in Figure 13. The
competitive market with a fringe entry has the highest welfare outcome and is the benchmark at
100. Welfare measures from other markets are presented as a percentage of the competitive scenario.
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Table 1 shows the welfare outcomes from the investment simulation in Figure 13. Even
though the monopoly with entrants scenarios produced the highest levels of investment,
they still have the lowest levels of total welfare. Lower welfare measures from these markets
are due to the monopoly withholding electricity production during off-peak hours. The last
four rows of Table 1 show that when comparing across energy markets with the same level
of market power, in this case a monopoly, a less strategic investment market will lead to a
higher level of total welfare.
The simulation in Figure 13 shows the investment outcome based on two levels of demand.
In reality, the optimal level of investment when we consider all hours depends on the distribution of demand over the lifetime of the capacity investment. However, the analysis here
shows that welfare increases when firms behave less strategically in the investment market
across all levels of demand. We have seen in the previous sections that when fringe entrants
are present, strategic behavior decreases in the market. Therefore, a market with fringe
entrants will result in a higher level of welfare relative to an identical market with no fringe
entrants.

1.9. Price Caps
Price caps in the electricity market can limit the effects of market power, but they can
also reduce the incentive for capacity investment because they lower profits for firms during
high demand hours. Price caps usually do not affect market prices during off-peak hours
when the market is producing below capacity, thus price caps do not change investment
incentives from off-peak hours. While off-peak hour incentives remain the same, price caps
decrease total investment incentives by decreasing scarcity rent during peak hours. This
section shows the effect of price caps on capacity investment incentives when Pr(Peak)=1.
During peak demand when demand and marginal revenue are crossing the vertical section
of the marginal cost curve, a price cap P̄ will bind if P̄ is lower than the market price at
capacity without the price cap. The marginal increase in revenue for additional capacity
under a binding price cap P̄ is:
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dR
= P̄
dxi

(1.32)

Under a binding price cap P̄ , firms are incentivized to invest up to x̄ when Pr(Peak)=1
where marginal increase in revenue is equal to the marginal increase in total cost:
0

P̄ = d + Ii (x̄i )

(1.33)

In any market, price caps below the marginal increase in revenue for additional capacity
at the equilibrium investment level without the price cap will reduce capacity investment
in the market. This is because the marginal increase in total cost must equal the marginal
increase in revenue for each firm. When the marginal increase in revenue decreases as a
result of the price cap, the marginal increase in total cost must also decrease with a lower
level of investment x̄.
Price caps are often set to reduce market power in the energy market. These price caps
are only effective in reducing market power during hours when the marginal revenue curve
is not crossing the vertical part of the marginal cost curve. Therefore, a price cap that
reduces market power will have to be set only during off-peak hours. If set during peak
hours, this lower price cap will decrease scarcity rent from peak hours. However, in practice, price caps in the electricity market do not vary by hour. Most electricity markets
only have one constant price cap that binds only during hours when demand is very high.
Since by assumption firms do not withhold during peak hours, this type of price cap that
lowers marginal increases in revenue during peak demand will reduce incentives for capacity
investment and firms will underinvest.
A key observation here is that investment level without a price cap is highest in a market
that has fringe entrants. This means that if a theoretical price cap decreases from high to
low, it will bind first for a market with fringe entrants.
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Proposition 10. A binding price cap will always decrease investment from the fringe but
may not decrease investment from markets without the fringe.

Proof. Starting with Equation 1.7, without a price cap each fringe firm will invest until the
market price for the next unit is equal to its marginal costs. A binding price cap will lower
the market price, thus fringe firms with marginal costs higher than the price cap but lower
than the equilibrium market price without the price cap will no longer invest.
A binding price cap may not decrease investment from other types of firms. For example,
consider a market with one monopoly making investments with no entrants. Without a
price cap, this monopoly will invest according to Equation 1.5, where the marginal increase
in revenue at x∗i equals the marginal costs. However, at x∗i , the market price is higher than
the marginal increase in revenue with respect to additional capacity. This means that any
price cap below the market price and above the marginal increase in revenue at x∗i will bind,
but will not decrease investment by the monopoly.

Proposition 10 implies that policy makers cannot create a price cap aimed at reducing
market power in the energy market without limiting entry from fringe firms. As an aside,
one interesting observation here is that this price cap can be used to increase investment.
For any price cap P̄ set between the market price and the marginal increase in revenue at
the optimal investment level x∗i , the marginal increase in revenue under the price cap will
be higher, leading to higher investment. A proof for this claim is in the appendix.
In addition to the possibility of reducing capacity investments, another downside of price
caps is excess demand.
Proposition 11. Let P̄ and x̄ denote the price cap and the market investment level under
the price cap, and let P ∗ and x∗ denote the market clearing price and the equilibrium
investment level in the market without the price cap. For any P̄ < P ∗ such that x̄ < x∗ ,
demand will exceed supply.
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Proof. Since P̄ < P ∗ , demand under the price cap is higher due to the lower price. However,
during peak hours equilibrium supply is equal to the total capacity in the market. Since
x̄ < x∗ , total supply in the market is lower under the price cap. Demand at the price cap
is higher than demand without the price cap, and supply under the price cap is lower than
the supply without the price cap. This leads to excess demand in the following form:

ExcessDemand(P̄ ) = D(P̄ ) − (K + x̄)

(1.34)

The magnitude of excess demand is given by the difference between demand at the price
cap and the market capacity.

Due to the price caps decreasing investment incentives by reducing scarcity rent and increasing demand beyond the total capacity in the market, many electricity markets under
price caps create a separate capacity market that pay firms for providing a set quantity of
generation capacity. The next section will cover the capacity market.

1.10. Capacity Market
Regulators may choose to create a capacity market for several reasons. First, regulators may
adopt a price cap to control prices in the energy market. This price cap may prevent firms
with market power from significantly increasing prices or put a ceiling on extreme price
spikes during unforeseen circumstances. Price caps decrease scarcity rent from peak hours,
and capacity markets can be installed to compensate firms for the revenue shortfall and
maintain the incentive for adequate capacity investment in the market. Second, regulators
may use the capacity market to ensure that a certain level of capacity will be available in
the market in the future. Regulators can determine this level of capacity to prevent total
blackouts, or even rolling blackouts, from excess demand or from extreme, once-in-a-decade
high demands.
Issues can occur in the capacity market when firms are behaving strategically. The total
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price paid in the capacity market will be higher than the total cost of the capacity investment. This is because all capacity from the capacity market is paid at the clearing price, and
most of that capacity will cost less than the clearing price to construct. Therefore, firms
with investment costs below the capacity market clearing price will make a profit. This
leads to the problem of market power in the capacity market, as firms can bid strategically
to increase the clearing price. A second issue is that firms can use the capacity market
to create more favorable conditions for themselves in the energy market. The regulators
set the price cap and the target capacity years in advance, but firms make energy market
decisions hourly. Therefore, a firm can use the capacity market to limit entry and maintain
market power in the energy market. This can be done when a firm bids additional capacity
in the capacity market at a lower price than the actual investment cost. This strategy will
prevent other entrants who are bidding at cost from entering, but it is a costly strategy for
the firm bidding below cost.
A firm with market power will have two opposing considerations: to decrease investment
in the capacity market and raise capacity price, or to increase investment in the capacity
market by underbidding in order to limit entry.

1.10.1. Capacity Market Model
In this model of the capacity market, there are two firms: an incumbent monopoly firm
that owns all preexisting capacity in the market, and a set of small entrants that make
up the fringe. I assume that both the monopoly and the fringe have the same investment
0

00

cost function: Ii (xi ), Ii (xi ) > 0, and Ii (xi ) > 0. Each firm in the fringe bids individually,
and the investment cost for each additional firm increases based on the investment cost
function. For the monopoly, cost for each additional MW of investment increases based on
the investment cost function. For any given target investment, x̄, the competitive outcome
would be both firms producing x̄/2. However, the monopoly can either increase or decrease
its level of investment to x∗ , which is its optimal strategic investment level. I will also assume
that the marginal cost of producing electricity is zero by setting the slope parameter c and
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the minimum marginal cost d both equal to zero. This assumption simplifies the profit
calculations during off-peak hours, but does not affect results from this section. All the
subsequent results will hold independent of the parameters in the marginal cost function as
long as the monopoly is able to exercise market power during off-peak hours.
When behaving strategically, the monopoly will invest x∗ to maximize its total profit in the
energy market and the capacity market. When there is fringe entry (x̄ − x∗ ), the residual
demand facing the monopoly during off-peak hours decreases to Q = a − bP − (x̄ − x∗ ).
After solving for the monopoly’s profit during off-peak hours under this residual demand,
the total profit for the monopoly is given by:

π=

(a − x̄ + x∗ )2
0
of f peak + P̄ (K + x∗ )peak + Ii (x̄ − x∗ )x∗ − Ii (x∗ )
4b

(1.35)

The first term is the profit for the monopoly from all off-peak hours when the marginal
revenue curve crosses the marginal cost curve at 0. I am making an assumption here that
when the monopoly is withholding during off-peak hours, the price will still be below the
price cap, P̄ . During off-peak hours, entry from fringe firms (x̄ − x∗ ) decreases profit for the
monopoly by reducing the residual demand. The second term is the profit for the monopoly
from all peak hours when it is producing at capacity and reaching the price cap. The third
term is the revenue from the capacity market, and the fourth term is the investment cost.
0

The clearing price in the capacity market is given by: Ii (x̄−x∗ ). The monopoly can increase
the capacity market clearing price by decreasing x∗ . But if x∗ decreases, the capacity, and
thus the market share of the fringe, increases and hurts the monopoly’s profit in the off-peak
energy market.
If we ignore the first term and only look at profits for the monopoly from peak hours
and the capacity market, the monopoly may have an incentive to withhold in the capacity
market, so that the bids from the fringe for the additional investment will clear at a higher
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price. However, once we also consider profits from off-peak hours, the monopoly will be less
incentivized to withhold, because additional entry from the fringe will reduce the ability
of the monopoly to exercise market power. The monopoly may even bid below cost in the
capacity market to limit fringe entry if this proves profitable in the off-peak energy market.
The direction of bids for the monopoly in the capacity market will depend on the profits
from off-peak hours. This following proposition summarizes the opposing incentives of the
monopoly.
Proposition 12. Denote x∗ to be the investment level that maximizes the monopoly’s profit
in the capacity market. When the monopoly increases investment from x∗ , profits during
off-peak and peak hours will increase, but its profits in the capacity market will decrease.

Proof. The proof follows directly from Equation 1.35. The first two terms in Equation 1.35
both increase with additional capacity. If x∗ increases, profits for the monopoly will increase
during peak and off-peak hours. Since x∗ maximizes the monopoly’s profit in the capacity
market, this means that x∗ maximizes the last two terms in 1.35. Any other investment
level that deviates from x∗ will decrease the last two terms in Equation 1.35.

When the monopoly increases investment to limit fringe entrants, this will allow the monopoly
to exercise market power to a greater degree during off-peak hours. However, when the
monopoly increases its investment, this means that the monopoly’s profits in the capacity
market will decrease as it increases investment to limit entry. The optimal decision for the
monopoly will depend on the distribution of off-peak demand, the investment cost functions
of all firms in the market, and the target capacity in the capacity market.

1.10.2. Limited Entry and Target Capacity Level
There are two special cases of interest: The first case is when there is limited entry for the
fringe, and the second case is the change in the monopoly’s behavior as target capacity x̄
changes.
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First, I analyze the case when the fringe has limited entry. I model limited entry for the
fringe by shifting its investment cost function with: Ii (xi + ∆), ∆ > 0 (note that this is
also the case when preexisting capacity is paid under reliability options). Denoting xLE
as the competitive investment level by the monopoly when the fringe has limited entry,
0

then the competitive clearing price in the capacity market is Ii (x̄ − xLE + ∆). Note that
the competitive capacity market price with limited fringe entry will be higher than the
competitive capacity market price without limited entry. This is because when the capacity
market is competitive, the equilibrium price is equal to the marginal investment cost for the
next unit of investment for both the monopoly and the fringe. When the fringe has limited
entry, its marginal investment cost increases. This means that fewer fringe firms will bid
into the capacity market while the monopoly increases its bids. This increases the marginal
investment cost for the next unit of investment from the monopoly and therefore increases
the competitive clearing price in the capacity market.
In this case, it will be more profitable for the monopoly to withhold from the competitive
outcome relative to the case without limited entry. This is because relative to the case
without limited entry, the increase in price for every unit of withholding from the competitive level will be higher, and the investment cost savings for every unit of withholding will
also be higher. Therefore, where there is limited entry from the fringe, the monopoly will
be incentivized to exercise more market power in the capacity market, as measured by the
number of units withheld relative to the competitive case.
Now I move to the case when the target capacity increases. When the target capacity is
higher, it will become more costly for the monopoly to limit entry. For any given target
capacity, x̄, the decrease in profit from the competitive level of investment is given by:

π(x∗ )−π(x̄/2) = −

i 0
x̄ h 0
0
Ii (x̄/2) − Ii (x̄ − x∗ ) +Ii (x̄−x∗ )[x∗ − x̄/2]−[Ii (x∗ )−Ii (x̄/2)] (1.36)
2
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The first and third terms increase with x̄ and the second term is always constant. This means
that the cost per quantity of entry reduction increases as the target capacity increases. This
00

result depends on Ii (x) > 0 or being close to zero. When the target capacity increases, the
monopoly will be less likely to limit entry and instead withhold to increase prices in the
capacity market.

1.10.3. Total Welfare with a Capacity Market
Revenue in the capacity market is a transfer in welfare from the consumers to the producers,
but this process on its own does not decrease total welfare if the capacity market does not
affect electricity demand. For example, if the capacity target is set to the same level as
the investment market outcome without the capacity market, the total welfare between
these two scenarios will be the same. In the scenario with the capacity market, consumers
will be worse off as they compensate the firms for their profits in the capacity market.
Regulators may choose to maximize welfare by setting a capacity target that is equal to the
investment level for a fully competitive investment and energy market. However, regulators
may also choose other capacity targets that are different from the fully competitive market
outcome. These reasons may include using the capacity market to compensate firms for
decreased scarcity rents from a price cap, to provide enough capacity to eliminate excess
demand under a price cap, or to prevent blackouts from once-in-a-decade or once-in-acentury extreme weather. Therefore, the total resulting welfare can increase or decrease
depending on the target set by the regulators in the capacity market.
For any capacity target, total welfare will also change if there is market power in the capacity
market and the energy market. When firms exercise market power in the capacity market,
the total resulting capacity increase does not change, but there will be a higher transfer
from the consumers to the producers as profits in the capacity market increase. However,
when profits in the capacity market increase, fringe entry will also increase leading to lower
market power during off-peak hours. This will increase quantity during off-peak hours
and increase consumer surplus during those hours. Therefore, consumers face the trade-off
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between less market power in the energy market versus paying a higher price for the same
capacity increase. The following proposition addresses consumer surplus formally.
Proposition 13. For a given capacity target x̄ in a capacity market with a monopoly and
fringe entrants, when consumer surplus increases in the off-peak hours, costs will increase in
the capacity market. And vice versa, when costs decrease in the capacity market, consumer
surplus will decrease in the off-peak hours.

Proof. Consumer surplus during off-peak demand is the area between the demand curve and
market price from zero quantity to the equilibrium quantity. This area is a triangle where
the height of the triangle is a − P , and the width of the triangle is the equilibrium quantity.
1
∗
2b (a−(x̄−x )).

Price is set by the monopoly and is equal to P =

Equilibrium quantity equals

the sum of the monopoly quantity and the fringe quantity, Q = 12 (a − (x̄ − x∗ )) + (x̄ − x∗ ).
Putting these terms together, the off-peak consumer surplus is:

CSop (x∗ ) =

1
2




a
x̄ − x∗
a x̄ − x∗
a−
+
+
.
2b
2b
2
2

(1.37)

This equation shows that consumer surplus during off-peak hours increases when x∗ decreases. However, the cost paid by consumers in the capacity market is:

0

CM (x∗ ) = Ii (x̄ − x∗ )x̄

(1.38)
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This cost increases when x∗ decreases because Ii (x) ≥ 0. Therefore, when consumer surplus
increases in the off-peak hours, costs will increase in the capacity market. And vice versa,
when costs decrease in the capacity market, consumer surplus will decrease in the off-peak
hours.

Total welfare is not affected by prices in the capacity market because the revenue in the
capacity market is a transfer from consumers to producers. Total welfare is also not affected
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by peak hours because all firms are producing at capacity. Total welfare only increases or
decreases based on the level of production during off-peak hours. When the monopoly withholds and increases profits in the capacity market, total welfare will also increase because
production will increase during off-peak hours. However, this increase in total welfare may
be very costly for consumers as they have to account for the increase in payments in the
capacity market.

1.10.4. Numerical Simulations for the Capacity Market
The comparative statics in the capacity market model depends on empirical parameter
values. The following numerical simulations use inputs close to empirical estimates from
the day-ahead-market in ERCOT from chapter 2. In this simulation, there are two levels
of demand. The peak demand is Q = 200, 000 − 150P , and the off-peak demand is Q =
20, 000 − 150P . There are 45,000 MW of preexisting capacity, all owned by the monopoly.
The marginal cost of generation is $20 per MWh. There are 20 hours per year at peak
demand, where the market price hits the price cap at $1,000 per MWh. To prevent excess
demand, regulators set 5,000 MW in the capacity market. Investment costs for monopoly
and the fringe are both I(x) = 200000x + 100x2 .
When designing a capacity market, the regulator may only take into consideration peak
hours. This intuitively makes sense because the main goal of the capacity market is to
create additional capacity for use during peak hours. However, due to strategic behaviors
by firms shown previously, the actions of firms in the capacity market will also depend on
off-peak demand. Therefore, the total distribution of off-peak and peak demand will need
to be taken into consideration in order to understand firm incentives in the capacity market.
The first three figures will show the difference in firm behavior if they only consider peak
hours or if they consider the distribution of peak and off-peak hours.
The monopoly will not exercise market power during peak hours and will produce at capacity. However, the monopoly can withhold in the capacity market to increase capacity price.
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Figure 14: Capacity Market and Peak Hour Profits for the Monopoly

If the capacity market is competitive the monopoly will invest 2,500 MW. Figure 14 shows
the capacity market and peak hour profit for the monopoly across a range of investment
levels. Without considering profits from off-peak hours, the monopoly will withhold its
investment level relative to the competitive outcome to below 2,000 MW.
However, withholding in the capacity market will prevent the monopoly from exercising as
much market power in the off-peak energy market. The additional entry from the fringe
will produce competitively in the energy market and decrease the residual demand for the
monopoly. Therefore, Figure 15 shows that the profit for the monopoly during the off-peak
hours increases monotonically with additional investment.
The capacity market incentivizes the monopoly to withhold while the off-peak energy market
incentivizes the monopoly to increase investment. Figure 16 shows the total effect on profit
for the monopoly across a range of capacity investments. The monopoly will invest close to
the competitive case at 2,398 MW.
Total welfare will increase with additional capacity. Total welfare also increases when the
monopoly withholds because total welfare in the energy market during off-peak hours will
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Figure 15: Off-Peak Profits for the Monopoly

Figure 16: Total Profits for the Monopoly
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Figure 17: Consumer Welfare

increase. However, when the monopoly withholds and increases the price in the capacity
market, consumer welfare decreases as profit for firms in the capacity market is a transfer
of welfare from the consumers to the producers. Figure 17 shows consumer welfare for the
range of monopoly investments. Consumer welfare is minimized when the monopoly invests
2,147 MW. This is close to the optimal investment level for the monopoly, which makes
sense because the monopoly maximizes its profits in large part by extracting welfare from
the consumers.
When the target capacity is lower, it is less costly for the monopoly to limit entry so
the incentive to limit entry will be greater than the incentive to withhold in the capacity
market. Figure 18 shows that as the target capacity increases, the monopoly will decrease
its investment level and at some point past 4,000 MW start withholding investment relative
to the competitive case.
When it is more expensive for the fringe to invest, the monopoly will benefit more by withholding and generating a higher price in the capacity market. This can create a situation
where the monopoly’s best strategy shifts from limiting entry to withholding in the investment market. Figure 19 is a simulation for an investment target of 3,000 MW. In this
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Figure 18: Different Capacity Targets

case, when the investment cost for the fringe is only slightly higher than the monopoly, the
monopoly is still limiting entry. However, as the investment cost increases for the fringe,
the monopoly shifts to a strategy of withholding to increase capacity market prices.

1.11. Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the interaction between market power and capacity investment under
various market structures in the electricity market. Starting with an energy-only market
without price caps, I show that the incentives for capacity investment come from scarcity
rents when demand is high. During these peak demand periods, market power in the electricity generation energy market does not have an effect on investment incentives. This
is because firms will all produce at capacity regardless of market power. Differences in
investment levels result from strategic behavior in the investment market. I show that total investment levels in the market increase with the number of incumbent firms and the
number of entrants. Investment levels increase more with entrants, and the highest level of
investment comes from a market with a set of small fringe entrants. Under the presence
of fringe entrants, firms will no longer be able to behave strategically in the investment
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Figure 19: Higher Investment Costs for the Fringe, 3000 MW Target

market. During lower demand periods, market power in the energy market does have an
effect on investment incentives. This is because during these hours firms are not producing
at capacity, and firms with market power have the ability to maintain higher prices through
strategic withholding. Additional capacity during these periods can increase quantity, decrease price, and decrease cost. The total effect depends on the specific level of demand and
where it crosses the supply, but the effect is generally not significant relative to the level
of scarcity rents during peak hours. I show that total welfare in an energy- only market
increases with capacity investment, and markets with fringe entrants which result in the
highest level of investment will also result in the highest level of welfare.
For markets with price caps, I show that price caps decrease scarcity rent and investment
incentives. Price caps also create excess demand during peak hours because demand at the
price cap will exceed a lower level of capacity investment. In order to provide sufficient
investment levels under a price cap, markets can introduce a separate capacity market that
compensates firms for the decrease in scarcity rents. I show that firms with market power
can leverage the capacity market to their advantage. Firms can either decrease entry in the
capacity market to increase capacity payments, or increase entry as a way to limit other
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entrants and maintain market power in the energy market. Both of these types of behavior
decrease consumer welfare.
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CHAPTER 2 : Capacity Investment and Market Power in the
Electricity Market, Evidence from ERCOT
2.1. Introduction
In the United States, resource adequacy is a major concern for electricity markets. In periods
when electricity generation capacity is unable to meet high, spiking demands, regional
electricity grids have experienced widespread rolling blackouts and extreme price spikes.
Electricity grids have taken various measures to establish sufficient supply of electricity to
meet demand. The electricity grid for Texas, ERCOT, incentivizes investment in generation
capacity by raising the price cap of electricity from $2,000 per MWh to $9,000 in 2015.
ERCOT anticipates that profits from scarcity pricing during high demand hours will provide
a strong incentive for firms to invest in adequate generation capacity. While it is true
that high scarcity rents could incentivize more capacity investments because the additional
capacity will be more profitable, what is unclear is the relationship between high scarcity
rent and capacity investment in the presence of market power. When firms exercise market
power, they are likely to withhold production and therefore underinvest in capacity to reduce
the supply of electricity in the future. However, firms with market power can also stabilize
prices through strategic withholding in the energy market and could be less negatively
affected, relative to a more competitive market, when electricity prices are reduced by
increases in capacity.
The goal of this chapter is to empirically evaluate the effects of market power on capacity
investment decisions in the electricity market. I measure welfare from capacity investments
in an electricity market under the presence of market power and compare the measurements
to welfare from a fully competitive electricity market. This paper extends previous empirical studies on market power in the electricity market to a more dynamic setting, where
firms with market power are making decisions to increase supply for future periods. The
implications from investment decisions under various market power scenarios form the main
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contribution of this paper.
My strategy for this analysis is comprised of three steps. In the first step I construct a model
of the electricity market, where firms make optimal decisions on electricity production and
capacity investment. In this model, firms make two types of decisions. The first type is how
much electricity to produce during each period when the firms face various levels of demand.
I will refer to this part of the model as the energy market. The second type of decision is
how much additional capacity to invest in-between periods. I refer to this part of the model
as the investment market. This model is flexible enough so that firms can either behave
strategically, where they consider the strategies of their competitors and also the effects of
their own strategies for the future, or behave competitively, where they take prices as given.
In the second step, I estimate the parameters in this model which characterize demand,
marginal cost, and investment cost functions using data primarily from ERCOT’s DayAhead-Market. In the third step, I use the model and the estimated parameters to simulate
electricity markets under different market power scenarios. Firms in these scenarios behave
either strategically or competitively in the energy market when they make their decisions
on production and also in the investment market when they make decisions to increase
their capacity. I calculate the effects of market power on capacity investment by comparing
welfare from the various scenarios with market power to a baseline where firms are all
behaving competitively.
I model the electricity market where firms make production and capacity investment decisions using a two-period model. Firms are capacity-constrained and compete in the first
period energy market either competitively or as a duopoly. At the end of the first period
firms make a decision to increase their capacity through a capacity investment. In this
investment market, firms are either specified to behave strategically, where they take into
account the behavior of their competitors as well as their own capacity investments and their
effects on price in the second period, or they are specified to behave competitively, where
they make capacity investment decisions assuming that the energy prices are fixed. Firms

67

then compete in the second period energy market with their generation capacities updated
to include their capacity investment. The environment in the second period is expected to
last for infinite periods, and profits and welfare from all future periods are discounted to
period 2. The equilibrium condition requires that all firms are behaving optimally given the
state variables in each period. For firms behaving strategically, the equilibrium condition
also requires that all firms are behaving optimally given the strategies of their competitors.
The estimation of the model includes three components: the demand function, the marginal
cost function, and the investment cost function. To estimate demand, I use data from
ERCOT’s Day-Ahead-Market which contains hourly price and quantity data at the firm
level. I use the same approach as used in Bushnell et al. (2008). Total demand in the
market is assumed to be perfectly inelastic. I estimate the demand function for strategic
firms in two steps. First, I estimate a supply function for fringe firms using total demand as
an instrument for price. Second I subtract this fringe supply from total demand to obtain
the residual demand function for strategic firms. For the marginal cost function, I use data
from the EPA to obtain heat rates for each generator. The marginal cost for each plant can
be calculated by multiplying its heat rate with fuel costs. I then construct the marginal
cost function for a particular firm or for the entire market by aggregating the marginal
costs from each generator. This method allows me to construct the actual marginal cost
functions for each firm without having to estimate them in the model. Finally, I estimate
the investment cost function using the structural methodology from Bajari et al. (2007). I
have to use a structural approach for the estimation of the investment parameters because
of the time lag between capacity investment decisions and the completed construction of
new generators. The presence of this time gap means that I cannot know when capacity
investment decisions are made by looking at capacity changes in the data. Therefore, I
must estimate the investment decisions based on strategic firm behaviors in the model.
After estimating the underlying parameters of the model, I simulate the electricity market
under four different market power scenarios where firms can behave strategically or com-
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petitively in the energy market and the investment market. I find that firms will invest at a
higher level when the investment market is competitive. This is because firms in a competitive investment market do not take into consideration that additional capacity will lower
prices in the future. When firms are investing strategically, they will invest at a lower level
because while additional investments will allow them to sell more quantity, the increase in
supply will also lower prices and decrease profits in the future. I also compare investment
levels between firms in a competitive energy market and a duopoly energy market. I find
that if firms in both scenarios are investing strategically, then there is no significant difference in capacity investment between firms in a competitive energy market and firms in
a duopoly energy market. These findings are consistent with the results developed in the
theory chapter.
There are two reasons why investments do not differ significantly between the two market
power scenarios in the energy market. First, during extreme-peak demand hours when prices
are $500 per MWh and above, competitive firms and duopoly firms both find it profitable
to invest at the same level and produce at capacity. The level of demand during these hours
means that even firms with market power will produce at capacity and not strategically
withhold. The incentive to invest in additional capacity comes primarily through these
hours, and during these hours the benefits from additional capacity for the firms are the same
regardless of market power. Second, during periods of non-extreme-peak demand, profits
for firms actually decrease with additional capacity due to decreasing prices. This price
effect hurts the competitive firms more because firms in a duopoly are able to strategically
withhold production to keep prices from decreasing. This means that during periods of low
demand, competitive firms are disincentivized from investing more than duopoly firms. Due
to the combination of these two reasons, capacity investment under a competitive energy
market is at the same level or slightly lower relative to capacity investment under an energy
market with market power.
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2.2. Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature on market power in the electricity market and literature on capacity investment in the electricity market. Previous literature showing the
existence of market power in the electricity market includes: Green and Newbery (1992),
Wolfram (1999), Borenstein (2000), Borenstein et al. (2002), Wolak (2003), Mansur (2007),
Bushnell et al. (2008), Hortaçsu and Puller (2008), and Ito and Reguant (2016). These studies on market power in the electricity market show the presence of market power in various
static environments in the energy market where firms withhold production to increase price.
I contribute to the literature on market power in the electricity market by showing the effects
of market power in a more dynamic setting where firms are making investment decisions for
future periods. Joskow and Tirole (2007) provide a theoretical framework to analyze the
effects of price caps on capacity investment. They find that under a price cap that reduces
market power and scarcity rents, capacity obligations and capacity payments can restore
investment incentives. Hogan et al. (2005) provide basis for an energy-only market to have
sufficient investment incentives. Bushnell and Ishii (2007) provide an investment model of
the electricity market. Bushnell et al. (2017) provide a survey of issues surrounding capacity
investment in the electricity market. Fabra (2018) uses a model to describe the relationship
between market power and investment with an emphasis on the regulatory instruments that
mitigate market power while providing sufficient investment incentives. McRae and Wolak
(2019) find that firms exercise market power by withholding production under the capacity
payment mechanism in the Colombian electricity market. Teirilä et al. (2017) show the
effect of market power in a capacity market. I contribute to this literature by analyzing the
effects of market power on capacity investment based on different levels of demand. I show
that market power in the energy market does not reduce incentives for capacity investment
during hours when prices are exceedingly high. During hours when prices are lower, the
ability for firms with market power to control price reduces investment disincentives from
the decreases in price caused by increases in generation capacity.
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I follow closely the methods from Ryan (2012), Fowlie et al. (2016), and Abito et al. (2019)
in my estimation of capacity investment costs using the two-step method based on Bajari
et al. (2007). The major difference for this paper is that I am only estimating a two period
model. For my demand estimations, I adopt the method in Bushnell et al. (2008) and Abito
et al. (2019). The estimation of the marginal cost function I also adopt from the literature
on the electricity market following Hortaçsu and Puller (2008) and Abito et al. (2019).
Abito et al. (2019) and this paper study the effects of market power in a more dynamic
setting where firms are making decisions for future periods and estimate investment cost
functions in the electricity market. The main difference between this paper and Abito et al.
(2019) is that this paper focuses on capacity investment outcomes under various market
power scenarios, while Abito et al. (2019) analyze the role of investment under different
externality markets.

2.3. Institutional Background
2.3.1. Market Power and Capacity in the Electricity Market
Many electricity markets in the United States and other countries were deregulated in the
1990s. Since then, wholesale electricity generators compete in the market place to sell their
electricity to retailers. In the U.S., electricity markets are coordinated by regional electricity
grids called ISOs/RTOs. Many markets span multiple states; an example is PJM, which
is the RTO that operates in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Illinois, and several other states.
Other markets, such as CAISO in California and ERCOT in Texas, operate as the main
ISO only within their respective states.
With the deregulation of electricity markets, a primary concern is market power. Generators
with sufficient market share have an incentive to withhold production and collect rent from
reduced supply. The existence of market power in the electricity market has been well
documented by previous studies such as Wolfram (1999) and Borenstein et al. (2002). Some
ISOs/RTOs have implemented price caps as a mechanism to reduce market power. For
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instance, PJM has a price cap of $1,000 per MWh of wholesale electricity. Price caps limit
the scarcity rents that electricity generators can collect, but the reduced rents could result
in firms being less willing to invest in additional generation capacity for the future. In a
competitive market with scarcity, firms will invest in additional capacity until the remaining
rents exactly offset the costs of the capacity investments. However, when the rents are
reduced by price caps, firms will have less rent to offset their investment costs resulting
in underinvestment in capacity. In order to ensure adequate investment, ISOs/RTOs with
low price caps have created a separate capacity market, in which generators are paid for
their additional capacity. PJM holds capacity auctions three years in advance to establish
capacity obligations and determine capacity prices.
The “price cap + capacity market” model has not been universally adopted. The Texas
electricity market, ERCOT, operates as an energy-only market without a capacity market.
The supporters of an energy-only market claim that it is the most economically efficient,
where customers are not paying for capacity that they might never use. In order to incentivize capacity investment, ERCOT has raised its price caps in recent years from $3,000
per MWh in 2012 to $9,000 in 2015, see Gülen and Soni (2013). ERCOT hopes that the
scarcity prices generated from the high price cap will allow generators to cover their investment costs. The goal of this paper is to study how scarcity rents incentivize capacity
investment under the presence of market power.

2.3.2. ERCOT and the Day-Ahead-Market
The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) supplies 90% of electricity load in
Texas. The grid connects more than 650 generation units operated by 263 firms or qualified
scheduling entities (QSEs). The top 5 QSEs occupy roughly 40% of market share. The
market consists of a Day-Ahead-Market (DAM) and a real-time spot market. In the DAM,
firms submit output one day prior to the operating day. The real-time market balances the
difference between the day-ahead schedules and the real-time load. Approximately 95% of
electricity is sold in the Day-Ahead-Market while the remaining 5% is sold in the balancing
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market.1 As an incentive to encourage more supply, the Public Utility Commission of Texas
raised the energy price cap from $3,000 per MWh to $4,500 per MWh starting on August
1, 2012. In October 2012, the Commission approved gradually increasing the cap to $5,000
per MWh in 2013, $7,000 per MWh in 2014, and then finally $9,000 per MWh in 2015.
This analysis focuses on the Day-Ahead-Market within ERCOT from 2011 to 2019. The
Day-Ahead-Market is a forward energy market that operates between 6:00 am and 1:30 pm
during the day before the real-time energy market. In the Day-Ahead-Market, firms place
bids and offers for electricity for each hour in the next day. Firms place bids to purchase a
certain quantity of electricity at the bid price. Firms place offers to supply a certain quantity
of electricity at an offer price. Firms must also specify the location for these bids and offers.
These bids and offers are cleared for each hour at a specific settlement point where the
measured output for each plant is settled. Firms with generation capacity must also submit
a Current Operating Plan for each hour of the next 7 days. The Current Operating Plan
specifies the anticipated conditions for each generation resource within the firm, including
the status of each plant and its capacity limits. My measure of the generation capacity for
each plant comes from this Current Operating Plan submitted by each firm.

2.4. Data Summary
I use data primarily from ERCOT’s Day-Ahead-Market from 2011 - 2019 and 2018 eGrid
data from the EPA. I use market-level data on price and quantity from ERCOT’s DayAhead-Market to estimate demand, and I use firm-level data on plant capacity to estimate
the capacity investment policy function. The ERCOT Day-Ahead-Market dataset does not
contain marginal cost data for each plant. For estimating plant-level marginal costs, I use
the latest available 2018 eGrid data from the EPA.
1
In this analysis, I will not take into account the effects of long-term contracts on investment decisions.
Theoretically, long-term contracts will fix profits from lower demand hours to be constant. This will remove
lower demand hours from contributing toward investment incentives, either positively or negatively. If a
higher level of quantity is signed under contracts, above current capacity, this will incentivize additional
investment in a similar way as a capacity market.
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ERCOT’s Day-Ahead-Market determines locational-marginal-prices (LMP) for each hour
at each resource node. I calculate hourly prices for the entire Day-Ahead-Market by taking
a load-weighted average of LMPs across all the resource nodes. Capacity for each plant is
determined by the high-sustained-limit (HSL) from ERCOT’s Day-Ahead-Market Generation dataset. HSL is the maximum sustained energy production capability of the plant. I
measure capacity for each firm at the annual level. I take the highest reported HSL for each
plant in a given year to be the plant’s capacity for that year. I then sum up all the plants
within each firm in each year to determine capacity at the firm-year-level. Table 2 contains
summaries for price, quantity, and capacity from my sample. Price and quantity are hourly
for the entire Day-Ahead-Market and capacity figures are at the firm-year-level.
Table 2: Market Overview

Hourly DAM Price
Hourly DAM Quantity
Capacity in MW
Capacity Change in MW

Min
0.00
2,032
5
-4,264

Mean
28.17
21,241
2,907
74

Max
5004.98
48,857
29,257
9,071

SD
72.76
6,855
4,728
895

Note: DAM is short for ERCOT’s Day-Ahead-Market. Price and Quantity are hourly and are taken
from ERCOT’s DAM from 2011 - 2019. Capacity and Capacity Change are taken from all 221 firms
in the same sample. Capacity is calculated as the highest level of High-Sustained-Limit (HSL) for
each firm in each year. Capacity Change is calculated as the change in capacity from one year to
the next for each firm.

In my analysis I concentrate on firms with market power that have the ability to adjust
their supply and strategically withhold production when profitable to do so. I refer to these
firms as strategic firms and define them in my sample as the top five firms based on market
share over the total sample period. I also require that the market share for each firm comes
only from their gas and coal plants. I define strategic firms in this way because these firms
all have significant market share. All the rest of the firms in the sample have a market
share below 1%. The remaining firms in my sample I refer to as the fringe. Fringe quantity
includes net imports, supply of non-strategic firms, and supply of non-gas-and-coal plants
of strategic firms.2 I use generation quantity from strategic and fringe firms in order to
2

The share of non-gas-and-coal plants for strategic firms is 8.8%. I include these quantities in the fringe
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estimate demand in the electricity market.
I use gas-and-coal capacity data in order to estimate the investment policy function. I
exclude renewables in the investment games because of the uncertainty for when they are
able to generate electricity. I am assuming that the investment games are primarily due to
the interaction among gas and coal plants. I make a further assumption that in this model,
the strategic market facing the estimated residual demand is closed to new entrants. This
means that the set of firms making investments within this market will stay constant with
no additional entrants. The strategic firms will base their investment decisions only on other
strategic firms. The assumption to exclude the fringe from the investment games is due to
the negative capacity change for fringe gas and coal firms over the sample period shown
in Table 3. Generation market share and capacity for strategic firms are also provided in
Table 3.
Table 3: Market Share and Capacity of Strategic Firms

Calpine
CPS Energy
Luminant
Brazos
LCRA
Strategic Total
Fringe Total

Market Share
19.7%
8.2%
5.3%
4.1%
3.1%
40.4%
59.6%

Avg Capacity in MW
23,130
7,147
17,948
3,807
3,996
56,028
81,557

Avg Capacity Change
758
315
1,752
44
126
2,995
-4,351

Note: Market share is the total share of sales for each firm in the sample. Average Capacity is
the average annual gas-and-coal capacity for each firm, and average capacity change is the average
change in capacity for each firm from year-to-year. The fringe capacity is shown in this table but is
not used for estimating the investment policy function. This is because I assume that the strategic
market facing the estimated residual demand is closed to new entrants due to the fact that fringe
gas-and-coal capacity does not increase over the sample period.

I also separate the hourly market data into four separate markets in order to better capture
demand variability. These four markets will be discussed in detail in the next section. They
due to three reasons. First, this definition for the fringe follows Abito et al. (2019). Second, renewable
generation for strategic firms represents a relatively small share, and the uncertainty for when renewables
are able to generate electricity reduces their ability for exercising market power. Third, I cannot construct
an accurate marginal cost function for renewable generators.
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Table 4: Comparison of the Four Demand Regions

DAM Price
Strategic Quantity
Fringe Quantity
N

Region-1
24.27
(14.37)
9,206
(3,972)
12,628
(3,107)
88,818

Region-2
119.85
(14.40)
16,148
(4,011)
14,642
(2,453)
334

Region-3
254.93
(93.63)
16,579
(4,363)
14,288
(2,316)
374

Region-4
1341.51
(849.26)
17,133
(5,534)
13,361
(2,204)
176

Total DAM
28.17
(72.76)
9,290
(4,054)
12,653
(3,103)
89,702

Note: The values for Strategic Quantity, Fringe Quantity, and DAM Price are sample averages from
hourly data from ERCOT’s Day-Ahead-Market. The sample standard deviations are in parentheses.

are referred to as region-1, region-2, region-3 and region-4 demand based on the region
where they cross the supply curve. Table 4 contains average price and quantity for each of
the four demand regions. The number of observations N is the total number hours in my
sample for each region.

2.5. Model
I model the electricity market using a two-period model. There are N strategic firms
competing in the energy market and making strategic decisions to invest in additional
capacity. Firms obtain revenue and incur electricity generation costs in the energy market.
Firms can increase their generation capacity in the investment market but also incur an
investment cost per unit of additional investment. At the beginning of period 1, each firm
owns a set of plants where each plant has a constant marginal cost. The set of plants for
each firm combine to form the firm’s marginal cost function and generation capacity. During
period 1, these strategic firms compete in the energy market. At the end of period 1, each
firm makes a decision to invest in additional generation capacity. Firms then compete in
the period 2 energy market with their marginal cost functions and generation capacities
updated after their capacity investment. Demand and capacity for each firm at the end
of period 2 are assumed to remain fixed forever, thus profits from period 2 will repeat for
infinite periods. Profits and welfare from all future periods are discounted into period 2
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Figure 20: Density of Hourly Prices above $100

Note: This graph shows a smoothed density of hourly prices when price per MWh is above $100 in
the ERCOT DAM from 2011 - 2019.

assuming a β = 0.9 discount rate.
There are also a set of smaller firms in the model that I assume to be non-strategic. I refer
to these as fringe firms. The fringe firms are necessary for demand estimation, but they
are not part of the model in the counterfactual experiments. The combined quantity of
strategic and fringe firms equals the total gas and coal quantity in my data.

2.5.1. Demand
Firms within ERCOT face a continuous possibility of demand functions that can cross the
marginal cost curve at any point up to the price-cap of $9,000 per MWh. Figure 20 is
a smoothed density of hourly prices above $100 from my sample of hourly ERCOT DayAhead-Market prices from 2011 - 2019. Each different price point represents a different
location where demand crosses the marginal cost function, and each market equilibrium
will have a different resulting change in profit to increases in capacity.
I do not model the total distribution of demand. Instead, I construct four representative
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demand functions that capture the variations of where the demand intersects with the
supply curve. These four demand functions each cross the supply curve at a different region
and highlight the various effects on profits with increases in capacity between competitive
and duopoly firms. These four demands are estimated based on four different price ranges in
the data. The price ranges are: below $100, $100-$150, $150-$500, and above $500. These
price ranges are determined somewhat arbitrarily, but the resulting demand functions will
cross the marginal cost function at four distinct regions.
Figure 21 shows the estimated demand function from each price range crossing the marginal
cost curve at four different regions. These four regions are chosen so that several distinct
effects on profit from additional capacity for both the competitive firm and the duopoly
firm can all be highlighted. The four regions on the marginal cost curve are categorized as
follows: region-1 is the left-most flat region on the marginal cost curve from 0 to slightly
past 30,000 MW; region-2 is the steeper part of the curve from roughly 32,000 MW to
42,000 MW; region-3 is the lower part of the vertical section; and region-4 is the higher
part of the vertical section. Demand estimated from the below $100 price range is the leftmost demand curve in Figure 21 crossing the marginal cost curve in region-1. In region-1
both the demand and marginal revenue curves cross the marginal cost curve in the flat
area. The effect on profit for both competitive and duopoly firms is relatively constant
with increases in capacity. Demand estimated from the $100 - $150 price range crosses
the marginal cost curve in the steeper region-2. This means that a competitive firm will
be much more sensitive to price decreases with additional capacity, while the duopoly can
maintain a higher price by withholding. Demand from the $150 - $500 price range crosses
the marginal cost curve in region-3. When this demand curve crosses this lower vertical
section, the marginal revenue curve will still cross the marginal cost curve at the positive
sloping part to the left. This means that with additional capacity, the competitive firm
will produce at capacity and the duopoly firm will withhold production. Demand estimated
from the above $500 price range crosses the marginal cost curve much higher up the vertical
section not shown in Figure 21. In this region firms will produce at capacity regardless of
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Figure 21: Demand Crossing Supply at 4 Regions

Note: This graph shows where demand curves cross regions 1-3 on the supply curve. These four
demands are estimated based on four different price ranges in the data. The price ranges are: below
$100, $100-$150, $150-$500, and above $500. Demand crossing region-4 from the above $500 price
range is not shown in the graph because it crosses the marginal cost curve much higher up the
vertical capacity constraint at P = $1,257.

the market power scenario. Throughout this chapter, I will sometimes refer to region-4
demand as extreme-peak demand.
The four demand functions are estimated empirically as residual demand facing strategic
firms from ERCOT’s Day-Ahead-Market data. For each of the four regions m, strategic
firms face the following residual demand:

m
qτs,m = α0τ
− α1 Pτm

(2.1)

qτs,m is the market-specific strategic quantity for each of the four regions of demand. Each
period, denoted by τ = {1, 2}, lasts one year. In each of the four regions, demand has the
m . Demand increases from
same slope parameter α1 , but differs in the intercept term α0τ
m = αm (1 + r). The growth rate r captures
period 1 to period 2 by growth rate r, where α02
01

the growth in demand over time and is estimated from the data. After period 2, demand is
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assumed to be fixed for infinite periods. This specification allows for an increase in demand
from period 1 to period 2 but not continuous growth after period 2. The assumption that
demand is fixed after period 2 is a simplifying assumption that allows me to solve this model
in two periods. This assumption will not affect the results of this analysis because firms
across different market power scenarios are always facing the same demand.

2.5.2. Marginal Cost
m that the firm is
Each firm i has a marginal cost function depending on the quantity qiτ

producing for each hour. In the electricity market, the marginal cost function for firms is
generally upward sloping because the lowest marginal cost plants will produce electricity
first, and when more production is needed, plants with higher costs come online. The
m ) and is constructed from the marginal
marginal cost function for firm i is specified by Ciτ (qiτ

cost and generation capacity of the firm’s set of plants. Each plant has a constant marginal
cost and a fixed generation capacity. In this formulation, I abstract from any ramping and
startup costs for each plant and only assume that each plant has a constant marginal cost
of generating electricity up to capacity. The marginal cost for each plant can be estimated
directly from the data, which will be discussed in detail in the next section.
In period 1, preexisting plants for each firm are ordered from the lowest to the highest
marginal cost. They are then combined to form an increasing step function where each step
corresponds to a particular plant. Let {c1i , ..., cni } denote the constant marginal costs for
firm i’s set of n plants ordered from the lowest to the highest. And let {ki1 , ..., kin } denote
the generation capacity corresponding to each plant. Firm i’s marginal cost function in
m ), is a step function where the height of each step is given by {c1 , ..., cn }
period 1, Ci1 (qi1
i
i

and the width of each step by {ki1 , ..., kin }. The estimated marginal cost for period 1 is
shown as the blue solid line in Figure 21.
When firm i makes a capacity investment xi at the end of period 1, a new plant with
capacity xi is added to the firm’s mix of plants. I will make the assumption that this new
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plant has the lowest available marginal cost technology. This assumption follows Abito et al.
(2019). The new set of plants for firm i is reordered from the lowest to the highest marginal
m ) is constructed for period 2. Since the newly
cost, and a new marginal cost function Ci2 (qi2
m ) adds a lower step with
invested plant has the lowest marginal cost, this means that Ci2 (qi2
m ) and shifts the rest of the function to the
width equal to xi to the starting point of Ci1 (qi1
m ) is assumed to be fixed for infinite periods.
right. After period 2, Ci2 (qi2

2.5.3. Investment Cost
In this model, firms make a one-time capacity investment at the end of period 1. I make a
simplifying assumption here that after making this one time capacity investment, the set of
plants for each firm will remain fixed and fully operational for infinite periods. This means
that firms will not divest or make any other capacity adjustments after the investment in
period 1. This assumption accounts for the fact that power plants are not newly built and
shut down on a frequent basis, but once they are built they are in operation for decades.
This model specification is similar to Abito et al. (2019) in that firms are only able to make
a positive adjustment to capacity, but differs from Ryan (2012) and Fowlie et al. (2016)
which include the possibility for firms to have scrap value when reducing their capacity.
This assumption that firms will not close down any plants means that I will not have scrap
value estimates for capacity investment in my model.
Investment cost for increasing capacity is assumed to be the same for all firms. I model the
cost for capacity investment xi using the following quadratic function:

I(xi ) = γ0 + γ1 xi + γ2 x2i

(2.2)

I assume that as firms increase their capacity, the marginal investment will become more
expensive. This specification is necessary in this model because it places a soft constraint
on the level of investment a firm can make in one single period. For convenience in the
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estimation procedure, I use a quadratic functional form to capture this increase in marginal
investment cost. The parameters of this quadratic function will be estimated using the
methodology developed by Bajari et al. (2007).

2.5.4. Stage Game
For firm i, the total profit across two periods is equal to the summation of profits from
each of the four regions in both periods minus the cost of capacity investment. Profits from
period 2 are expected to remain fixed for infinite periods and discounted by β = 0.9.

Πi =

4
X

m
m
− Ci1 (qi1
)] +
[P1m (q1s,m )qi1

m=1

4
β X m s,m m
m
)] − I(xi )
[P2 (q2 )qi2 − Ci2 (xi ; qi2
1−β

(2.3)

m=1

The reason that future profits must also be included and discounted into period 2 is because
the estimated investment cost is for the lifetime of the plant. By discounting all future profits
into period 2, I am comparing the profits generated from the plant’s entire operational
lifetime to its total lifetime cost.

2.5.5. Equilibrium
Under demand in each of the four regions in periods 1 and 2, each firm i makes decisions on
m for τ = {1, 2} and m = {1, 2, 3, 4}, to produce while strategically
how much electricity, qiτ

taking into account how much other firms are producing. Each firm also makes a decision on
how much xi to invest at the end of period 1, while also taking into account the investment
and production decisions of other firms. Let σ denote the set of parameters for the demand
functions, marginal cost function, and investment cost function in this model. The strategy
m and x given σ and the strategy profile of
profile for each firm i is the set of decisions qiτ
i

firm i’s competitors. Equilibrium in this model requires that the strategy profile for each
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firm i satisfy the following condition:
m∗ ∗
m
m
m
Πi (qiτ
, xi |σ; q−iτ
, x−i ) ≥ Πi (q̃iτ
, x̃i |σ; q−iτ
, x−i )

(2.4)

m∗ and x∗ , is optimal relative to all possible alternative
where each firm’s strategy profile, qiτ
i
m and x̃ , given the strategy profiles of its competitors and model parameters
strategies, q̃iτ
i

σ.

2.6. Empirical Strategy
2.6.1. Demand Estimation
The goal for demand estimation is to estimate the residual demand functions facing strategic
firms. I define strategic firms as the 5 gas-and-coal firms with the highest market share over
the sample period 2011-2019 in ERCOT’s Day-Ahead-Market. My strategy for estimating
demand follows the method from Bushnell et al. (2008) and Abito et al. (2019), where the
residual demand for strategic firms equals the perfectly inelastic market demand less the
elastic supply of fringe firms. In this approach, I estimate a fringe supply and then subtract
it from the vertical inelastic market demand to obtain the residual demand for strategic
firms. Fringe supply includes net imports, supply from non-strategic firms, and supply from
strategic firms excluding gas and coal. Once the fringe supply function is estimated, the
residual demand for strategic firms is constructed by subtracting the fringe supply from the
perfectly inelastic total market demand.
The data is hourly data from the ERCOT Day-Ahead-Market from 2011 through 2019.
Each of the four regions is determined by the hourly DAM for each hour. Region-1 contains
all the hours when prices are below $100, region-2 contains hours when prices are between
$100-$150, region-3 contains hours when prices are between $150-$500, and region-4 contains
hours when prices are above $500. For each region, an indicator term is added to the fringe
supply to capture the hours when prices are within that region. Each hour is denoted by
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time subscript t, and Pt is the weighted average hourly locational-marginal-price for the
entire ERCOT Day-Ahead-Market. I denote regionmt to represent four indicator variables
that capture each region. For each region m = {1, 2, 3, 4}, regionmt is equal to 1 when the
price during that hour falls within the region and 0 for all other hours.
Since net imports are a part of fringe supply, this means that fringe supply is a function
of ERCOT prices as well as prices from surrounding states where electricity is imported.
Following Abito et al. (2019), I proxy for electricity prices in the four states surrounding
ERCOT using average cooling and heating degree days and their squares. Let CDDst
denote the average cooling degree days in each of the four states s surrounding ERCOT
and HDDst denote the average heating degree days.
Following Bushnell et al. (2008) and Abito et al. (2019), I use the perfectly inelastic market
demand Qt as an instrument for Pt . The fringe supply function has the following specification:

qtf ringe

=α1 ∗ Pt +

4
X

θmy ∗ regionmt ∗ Y eary +

4
X

m=1

+

+

4
X
s=1
12
X
h=1

2
α2s CDDst
+

µh M onthh +

α1s CDDst

s=1
4
X

α3s HDDst +

s=1
2019
X

4
X

2
α4s HDDst

(2.5)

s=1

γy Y eary + t .

y=2011

This specification for residual supply, including month and year fixed effects, is almost
identical to the specification in Abito et al. (2019). The major difference in this case is the
inclusion of the 4 regionmt indicator variables. Rewriting the fringe supply function as:

qtf ringe = α1 ∗ Pt + Γm
t ,
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(2.6)

where
Γm
t

=

4
X

θmy
m=1
4
X

∗ regionmt ∗ Y eary +

s=1

+

12
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s=1

2
α2s CDDst
+

+

4
X

µh M onthh +

4
X

α3s HDDst +

s=1
2019
X

4
X

2
α4s HDDst

s=1

γy Y eary + t .
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h=1

The demand for strategic firms in each region can be obtained by subtracting the fringe
supply from total demand:

qts,m = Qt − qtf ringe = Qt − Γm
t − α1 ∗ Pt .

(2.7)

For each of the four regions m, let Tm denote the total number of hours in each region. The
m , is calculated by taking the average of all
intercept for period 1 demand in my model, α01

hourly intercepts estimated in the data for each market m:

m
α01

Tm
1 X
Qt − Γm
=
t .
Tm

(2.8)

t=1

Putting all this together, the demand function in period 1 of my model is given by:

m
q1s,m = α01
− α1 P1 .

(2.9)

Based on this construction, the estimated slope for each of the four regions will be the same.
Demand functions representing each region are differentiated by their intercepts. Growth
m is 0.025. This is
rate r for calculating the demand intercept in period 2 in my model α02

taken from ERCOT’s projected annual demand growth rate.
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2.6.2. Estimating the Marginal Cost of Generation
Marginal cost for individual plants is conventionally modeled as a constant value up to
capacity. The marginal cost for each plant is a summation of its fuel costs per MWh plus
its variable operation and maintenance costs (VOM) per MWh. Fuel costs per MWh can
be calculated by multiplying each plant’s heat rate with fuel costs. For this analysis I am
assuming VOM costs for all plants to be zero. The marginal cost for plant j for fuel type
f is given by:

cj = HRj × Pf .

(2.10)

Heat rate HRj and capacity k j for each individual plant is taken from the EPA’s Emissions
& Generation Resource Integrated Database (eGRID) for 2018. This is the latest dataset
from the EPA and will allow me to construct the most up-to-date marginal cost function for
each firm. This will also allow me to construct the latest snapshot of the supply function
in ERCOT for my model. Plants either use natural gas or coal. The 2018 natural gas price
is taken from the Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price listed in EIA. The 2018 coal price is
taken from the 2020 Annual Coal Report from EIA.
Once the marginal cost is estimated for each plant, all plants within each firm are ordered
from the lowest to the highest marginal cost. I then create a step function where each step
has height equal to the marginal cost and width equal to the capacity of the corresponding
plant. I smooth this step function using a monotone cubic interpolation so that the final
marginal cost function for each firm is monotonically increasing and differentiable.

3

The marginal cost of newly constructed plants from the capacity investments is calculated
3

Suppose there are n plants. Let {y 1 , ..., y n } denote the marginal cost for each plant ordered from the
lowest to highest and let {x1 , ..., xn } denote the cumulative capacity up to plant j, where xj equals the
summation of the capacity of all plants up to plant j. The spline function S(x) is a function satisfying
S(xj ) = y j for all j, and S(x) for x 6= xj is a polynomial of degree 3. An additional adjustment on the
slope of the interpolation using the method given in Hyman (1983) is performed to ensure monotonicity of
S(x). My reason for using a cubic interpolation is due to its ease of use, and its ability to create stable and
monotone functions. Higher-order splines tend to exhibit oscillations that result in non-monotonic functions.
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using the lowest average heat rate technology from EIA in 2019, which is the combined cycle
natural gas generator. The natural gas price for period 2 remains the same as in period
1, which is the 2018 natural gas price taken from the Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price
listed in EIA. New capacity investments, with their capacity and marginal cost, are added
to each firm’s mix of plants and the step functions are updated. These step functions are
again smoothed to create each firm’s marginal cost function for period 2. The marginal cost
function is assumed to be fixed after period 2. This also implicitly assumes that fuel costs,
as well as all other costs associated with the marginal cost function, are fixed after period
2.

2.6.3. Estimating the Investment Cost Function
I estimate the investment cost function using the methodology developed by Bajari et al.
(2007). My process is similar to the strategies used in Ryan (2012), Fowlie et al. (2016), and
Abito et al. (2019). The only major difference is that my model of the electricity market has
only two periods, where the firms each make a one-time investment. I first estimate a policy
function from the data describing the capacity investment behavior of individual firms. I
then find the parameters in the investment function that make the capacity investment
behavior from the policy function optimal within my model.
When making investment decisions, strategic firms take into consideration their own preexisting capacity as well as the preexisting capacity of their competitors. For each strategic
firm i at time t, I model its change in capacity for the next period by:

∆Capit+1 = δ1 Capit + δ2 Cap2it + δ3 Cap−it + δ4 Cap2−it + δ5 Capit Cap−it + it .

(2.11)

This policy function is based on the assumption that the residual demand facing the strategic
firms is closed to new entrants. Therefore, each firm makes its investment decision taking
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into consideration only other strategic firms already present in the market. The quadratic
functional form captures nonlinearities in each firm’s investment decision.
Data on capacity is from the ERCOT Day-Ahead-Market generation dataset from 2011 2019. I make the assumption that firms within my sample make capacity adjustments once
a year. The policy function is estimated at the firm-year-level. The time subscript t in the
policy function denotes the year, and capacity at time t for each firm is measured as the
highest level of capacity for that firm during year t. Once I estimate this policy function
from the data, I then apply it in my model to determine the change in capacity for each
strategic firm from period 1 to period 2.
In order to estimate the investment cost function for strategic firms, I will need to find the
investment cost parameters that make the policy function optimal for each firm. I model
the strategic market as a duopoly where there are two identical firms. There are more than
two strategic firms in my sample, but I am reducing the strategic market to two identical
firms as a simplifying assumption so that I can more easily solve the model.4
Once I estimate the policy function using strategic firms in my sample, I will then assume
that the each duopoly firm will have this same policy function. Both identical duopoly firms
will also have the same marginal cost function. I construct these two identical marginal
cost functions by taking plants for all strategic firms in the 2018 eGrid data and dividing
their capacity evenly between the two duopoly firms.
My decision to reduce the strategic market to a duopoly is for computational reasons and
follows a similar methodology from Abito et al. (2019). When the number of strategic firms
is reduced from five to a duopoly, this means that the profits for each of the duopoly firms
will increase. When the model equates this higher profit to the same investment policy
4
It is possible to solve this model as an N firm asymmetric oligopoly. The process estimating investment
costs will be as follows: first, obtain the investment level for each firm based on the policy function. Second,
solve N firm asymmetric equilibrium in the energy market. Third, find the investment cost function that
makes the investment level for each firm optimal. The more difficult computation occurs during counterfactual experiments. In these experiments, the investment equilibrium is obtained by solving for the optimal
investment level for one firm while holding all others constant, and then cycling through each firm until an
equilibrium is reached. The search space for this process grows exponentially with the number of firms.
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function, this means that a higher investment cost will result from solving the model as a
duopoly relative to solving the model with five firms.
In this model, these two duopoly firms make decisions over two periods where they decide
how much electricity to produce in each period and how much capacity investment to
build at the end of period 1. The demand functions that I use in period 1 for each of
the four regions are the hourly demand functions estimated from my sample of ERCOT’s
Day-Ahead-Market from 2011-2019. The marginal cost function for each duopoly firm for
period 1 is constructed from plant-level data for all ERCOT strategic firms in the 2018
eGrid data, which is the most up-to-date dataset on plant-level capacity and heat rate. I
calculate an hourly profit for each of the four regions for each firm by finding a symmetric
Cournot equilibrium. For total profits in period 1 for each firm, I multiply profits from
each hour based on the number of hours in each region in a year and sum them together. I
assume that there are 37 hours in region-2, 42 hours in region-3, and 20 hours in region-4,
which is the average number of hours per year for each of these regions over my sample
period. The remaining hours in the year are counted in region-1.
After period 1, I already know the capacity for each firm from its marginal cost function. I
can use Equation 2.11 and plug in each firm’s capacity in period 1 to calculate the changes
in capacities for period 2. The marginal cost function in period 2 for each firm is updated
after the new capacity investments are determined from the policy function. Demand in
period 2 also increases from period 1 where the demand intercept grows by r = 0.025, which
is ERCOT’s projected annual demand growth rate. Total profit for each firm in period 2 is
calculated in the same way as in period 1. I calculate for each firm its profits per each of the
four regions assuming a Cournot equilibrium. Profits during these hours will be different
from period 1 due to changes in demand as well as changes to each firm’s marginal cost
function and capacity after the capacity investment. I then sum up all the hours according
to the total number of hours in each region in a year to obtain total period 2 profits for
each firm. Period 2 profits for each firm are assumed to remain fixed for infinite periods;
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these future profits are discounted to period 2 with discount rate β = 0.9.
Profits from period 1 are independent of any investment decisions. When firms make investment decisions at the end of period 1, they are incentivized to invest in order to increase
profits in period 2. Additional capacity investments will change each firm’s marginal cost
function and capacity for period 2. When firms compete in the Cournot duopoly in period
2, the equilibrium quantity will be based on each firm’s new cost function and capacity.
Therefore in period 2, the marginal cost function, as well as the quantity produced are
both functions of investment decisions. Without loss of generality, let x1 and x2 denote the
investment levels for each firm. Firm 1’s total profit in the period 2 energy market as a
function of x1 and x2 is given by:

π1 (x1 , x2 ) =

3
X

m
m
m
m
[P2m (q12
(x1 , x2 ) + q22
(x1 , x2 ))q12
(x1 , x2 ) − C12 (x1 ; q12
)].

(2.12)

m=1

Let δ ∗ denote the set of policy function parameters estimated from the data, and x1 (δ ∗ )
denote the investment level for firm 1. The total value for firm 1 from this investment
can be calculated by subtracting the investment cost from the discounted period 2 profits
repeated over infinite periods. The investment cost function from Equation 2.2 has a set of
parameters denoted by γ. The value for firm 1 as a function of δ ∗ and γ is given by:

V1 (δ ∗ , γ) =

β
[π1 (x1 (δ ∗ ), x2 (δ ∗ ))] − I(x1 (δ ∗ ); γ).
1−β

(2.13)

The true parameter set δ ∗ is the optimal policy response. Therefore, V1 (δ ∗ , γ) has the
highest value compared to all alternative policies δ̃. Imposing the equilibrium condition
gives:

V1 (δ ∗ , γ) ≥ V1 (δ̃, γ).
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(2.14)

Rewriting the equilibrium condition as profitable deviations from the optimal policy gives
the following equation:

g(δ̃, γ) = [V1 (δ ∗ , γ) − V1 (δ̃, γ)].

(2.15)

I draw a sample of J = 1000 alternative policies. These policies range from 500 MW
below the optimal policy investment to 500 MW above. The estimator then searches for
the investment cost function parameters γ to minimize the profitable deviations from the
optimal policy. The objective function is given by:

J
1X
g(δ̃j , γ)2
min
γ J

(2.16)

j

By construction, both firms in the duopoly have the same capacity in period 1. This means
x1 (δ ∗ ) = x2 (δ ∗ ) which implies that both firms will also make the same investment decision
and remain identical in period 2. This further implies that both firms will have the same
profit outcomes in the period 2 energy market when it is solved as a symmetric duopoly
equilibrium. Since I also assume that both firms have the same investment cost function,
estimating equation 2.16 for firm 1 will be sufficient for both firms.5

2.7. Estimation Results
2.7.1. Demand Function
Residual demand for strategic firms is estimated by first estimating the fringe supply function and then subtracting the fringe supply from the perfectly inelastic market demand.
5

The intuition underlying the BBL process is as follows: within this model, the policy function computes
a specific investment level for next period. Then the BBL procedure finds the investment cost function that
makes the investment level optimal for each firm taking into account the change in profits from the new
investments. In a simple example, suppose in a perfectly competitive market, the policy function specifies
5 MW of investment for each firm. The market equilibrium model computes that each firm will earn $100
from the investment. Then BBL will estimate that the investment cost is $20 per MW.
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Figure 22: Predicted versus Actual Prices by Month

Note: The data presented in this graph is at the monthly average level for visual representation.
The regression is estimated at the hourly level.

The slope of the demand functions for each of the four regions is the estimated α1 from
Equation 2.5. The hourly demand intercept for each of the four regions is constructed by
the summation of the remaining terms in Equation 2.5 taking into account each specific
θmy estimate for each region m and year y. The intercepts for the demand functions in the
model are calculated by taking the average of all hourly intercepts estimated in the data
for each region m.
Figure 22 is a comparison of the predicted prices versus actual prices from the data. The
prices are estimated and predicted at the hourly level, but averaged to the monthly level for
this comparison. The actual prices are slightly more volatile than what the model predicts,
but the model does capture the periods when prices are high.
Table 5 presents the two-stage least squares estimate for the price variable from the fringe
supply. The P rice row gives the slope for the strategic demand in each region. This slope

92

Table 5: Fringe Supply

P rice
m
α̂01
Hours per Year
Observations

Region-1
226.68
(6.32)
16,620
8,662
46,002

Region-2
226.68
(6.32)
43,944
37
46,002

Region-3
226.68
(6.32)
74,360
42
46,002

Region-4
226.68
(6.32)
328,331
20
46,002

Note: This regression is from hourly data from ERCOT’s Day-Ahead-Market. The dependent
variable is the Fringe Supply. The estimate for the P rice variable from the Fringe Supply is the
slope of the residual demand for strategic firms. The estimated standard error is in the parentheses.
m
The slope estimate is the same for the demand functions in all four demand regions. The α̂01
variable is the intercept for each of the four demand regions. The intercepts are constructed from
the remaining estimates in the Fringe Supply equation according to Equation 2.9.

is constant across all four regions because all regions are estimated using a single equation.
m is the intercept term for the strategic residual demand in each region
The variable α̂01

derived from the fringe supply according to Equation 2.8. We can see that the estimated
intercepts increase from regions 1 to 4. As the intercepts increase, the demand shifts to the
right and crosses the supply curve at a higher quantity.

2.7.2. Marginal Cost Function
Marginal cost for individual plants is estimated using the 2018 eGrid data by multiplying
each plant’s heat rate with fuel costs from 2018. Plants from the eGrid data are matched
to strategic firms in the ERCOT data. The marginal cost function for the entire strategic
market is constructed by ordering the plants from the lowest to highest marginal costs and
then creating a step function where the height of each step is the plant’s marginal cost and
the width the plant’s capacity. For the two duopoly firms in my model, I divide the capacity
of each plant into two and attribute each half to each duopoly firm. The marginal cost for
each individual duopoly firm is the same as the marginal cost for the entire strategic market,
except that the capacity for each plant is cut in half. I then smooth each step function into
a differentiable function using a cubic spline.
Figure 23 shows the estimated marginal cost function for one duopoly firm. The blue solid
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Figure 23: Duopoly Firm Marginal Cost Function

Note: The marginal cost function is estimated using 2018 eGrid data. This graph presents the
marginal cost function for a single firm in the duopoly. This marginal cost function is constructed
by dividing the capacity of all strategic plants into two and then combining the half capacities of all
strategic plants into a single firm. The red dotted line represents the updated marginal cost function
after the firm makes a hypothetical capacity investment of 2,000 MW.

curve is the marginal cost function estimated from data which represent the marginal cost
for this duopoly firm in period 1. The capacity for this firm in period 1 is 21,690 MW, and
the marginal cost function becomes vertical at capacity. When this firm makes a capacity
investment at the end of period 1, the previous step function is updated to incorporate the
additional capacity and the function is once again smoothed. Figure 23 shows an updated
marginal cost function with the red dotted curve after a hypothetical 2,000 MW investment
by this firm. Since the new investment is assumed to have the lowest cost technology,
graphically this means that that marginal cost curve from period 1 is shifted to the right
by 2,000 MW, and the new investment with the lowest cost is inserted into the very left of
the new curve.
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2.7.3. Investment Cost Function
To estimate the investment cost function I use the two-stage method from Bajari et al.
(2007). In the first stage I estimate an investment policy function describing the investment
behaviors of strategic firms in the data. Table 6 shows the results from the investment policy
function parameters. This function is estimated for strategic firms at the annual level with
the assumption that these firms are making investment changes once a year.
Table 6: Investment Policy
Variable
Own Capacity
Own Capacity Sq.
Competitors’ Capacities
Competitors’ Capacities Sq.
Own x Competitors’ Capacities
Observations

Estimate
0.110
( 0.303 )
0.00000232
(0.00000779)
0.0217
(0.0924)
- 0.00000270
( 0.00000145 )
- 0.00000332
( 0.00000472 )
45

Note: This table represents the estimates for the reduced form policy function in the first stage
of estimating the investment cost function. The dependent variable is change in capacity for each
strategic firm. The parameters are estimated using OLS.

Based on these estimates, for a firm with 10,000 MW of capacity against 40,000 MW of its
competitors’ capacities, the marginal increase in capacity when its own capacity increases
is 0.02 MW. The marginal decrease in capacity when its competitors’ capacities increase is
-0.23 MW. This means that each firm’s capacity investment is positively correlated with its
own capacity and negatively correlated with its competitors’ capacities. This makes sense
intuitively because as investment levels increase for its competitors, the marginal profit
for the next unit of capacity investment decreases for the firm, leading to a decrease in
investment. When the estimates from Table 6 are used to fit the symmetric duopoly in
my model, this policy function implies a capacity increase of 1,120 MW per year for each
duopoly firm. The average increase in capacity for each strategic firm in my ERCOT sample
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is 998 MW per year.
In the second stage I use this policy function to calculate the investment levels for the
duopoly firms in my model at the end of period 1 and then solve for the investment cost
function parameters that make the policy function optimal for the firms according to the
specification from Equation 2.16. The estimates for the investment cost parameters are
listed in Table 7. Based on these estimates, the average cost per MW for a 100 MW
generator is $998,809 per MW. This is similar in magnitude to the $1.4 million per MW
estimate from Abito et al. (2019) for gas-fired capacity and also the $1.08 million per MW
average construction cost for natural gas plants reported by the EIA (2019).
Table 7: Investment Cost
γ0
74,288,882

γ1
247,740

γ2
81.8

Note: The investment cost function has the functional form: I(xi ) = γ0 + γ1 xi + γ2 x2i . These estimates imply an average cost of $998,809 per MW for a 100 MW generator. The average construction
cost for a natural gas generator in 2019 reported by the EIA is $1.08 million per MW.

2.8. Counterfactual Results
Table 8 shows the price and quantity simulations based on the estimated demand and
marginal cost functions under various market power assumptions. For comparison, row one
is the actual price and quantity averages from the ERCOT Day-Ahead-Market. In row two
I am assuming that the energy market is competitive, so I calculate the price and quantity
based on where the estimated residual demand functions cross the marginal cost function for
the total strategic market. In row three I am assuming a duopoly strategic energy market
where there are two firms, each with marginal cost functions identical to Figure 23, playing
a Cournot game. In row four I am assuming that there is a monopoly with a marginal cost
function equal to the marginal cost function for the total strategic market.
In region-1, price is between the competitive scenario and the duopoly scenario. In the
other regions, actual prices exceed the simulated prices. This is because the prices in
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Table 8: Period 1 Price and Quantity Comparison

Data
Competitive
Duopoly
Monopoly

Region-1
24.27
21.92
39.04
47.35

Data
Competitive
Duopoly
Monopoly

Region-1
9,206
11,651
7,770
5,886

Price
Region-2 Region-3
119.85
254.93
41.85
136.67
81.96
146.84
109.42
182.02
Quantity
Region-2 Region-3
16,148
16,579
34,456
43,380
25,365
41,073
19,141
33,100

Region-4
1341.51
1257.05
1257.05
1257.05
Region-4
17,133
43,380
43,380
43,380

Note: region-3 and region-4 quantity from the data is the sample average, the maximum quantity
for 2018 in region-3 is 41,163 and in region-4 is 38,873.

the actual market in the higher regions are often caused by a reduction of supply, and
the supply is constant in the simulations. We can see that in region-1, where demand in
most hours occurs, there is still a moderate level of market power. For the estimation
of investment costs, I assume that the strategic energy market is a duopoly in order to
capture this moderate presence of market power. Price and quantity in region-4 is the same
for competitive, duopoly, and monopoly markets. This is because based on the estimated
region-4 demand, firms will produce at capacity regardless of the level of market power.

2.8.1. Market Power Scenarios
The estimation of investment costs allows for the possibility to simulate capacity investments
in counterfactual experiments. The primary interest for this analysis is to investigate the
investment levels under different market power scenarios and the resulting implications on
welfare. My model of the electricity market for the counterfactual experiments is also a two
period model. Firms compete in the energy market in the first period. At the end of period
1 they make a capacity investment and then compete in the period 2 energy market. In
this model, firms make two different decisions: a decision on how much to invest, which I
will refer to as the investment market; and a decision on how much electricity to produce

97

after the investment, which I will refer to as the energy market.
I construct four different market power scenarios. The first scenario is a strategic investment
market followed by a competitive energy market. In this scenario, there are two firms making
strategic decisions in the investment market and then producing at the competitive quantity
level in the second period energy market. These firms are aware of the effect of additional
capacity investment on their profits in the second period energy market as they are making
their investment decisions. The second scenario is a strategic investment market followed
by a duopoly energy market. In this scenario, two firms make strategic decisions in the
investment market and then produce at a duopoly equilibrium in the second period energy
market. These firms are also aware of the effect of additional capacity in the second period
energy market as they are making their investment decisions. Without loss of generality,
the decision for firm 1 in the strategic investment market followed by either a competitive
or duopoly energy market can be described by the following profit equation:

max
x1

4
X

m∗
m∗
[P2m (Qm∗
2 (x1 , x2 ))q12 (x1 , x2 ) − C12 (x1 ; q12 (x1 , x2 ))] − I(x1 )

(2.17)

m=1

For any given investment level x1 for firm 1, the cost function for firm 1 in period 2 is
m ). q m is the quantity produced by firm 1 in period 2 for each of the
updated to C12 (x1 ; q12
12
m
four regions m. In both the competitive energy market and the duopoly energy market, q12
m
depends on investments by both firm 1 and firm 2. In the competitive energy market, q12

depends on the new supply curve updated with investments from both firms x1 + x2 . In
the duopoly energy market, the Cournot equilibrium is a function of the new marginal cost
functions of both firms updated by x1 and x2 . I denote the equilibrium quantity for firm
m∗ (x , x ). For any
1 in period 2, whether competitive or duopoly, in each market m as q12
1 2

fixed investment by firm 2, x2 , firm 1 finds the optimal investment level x1 that maximizes
its period 2 profit according to Equation 2.17.
I solve the equilibrium in the strategic investment market as a symmetric equilibrium. Let
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the best response functions for firm 1 and firm 2 be denoted by x∗1 (x2 ) and x∗2 (x1 ), where
x∗1 (x2 ) is the solution to Equation 2.17 for any given x2 . The two firms are symmetric after
period 1 so x∗1 (x) = x∗2 (x)∀x. I then take the best response function for firm 1 and find x
such that x∗1 (x) = x, and since x∗2 (x) = x, I now have found a symmetric equilibrium where
x∗1 (x) = x∗2 (x) = x.
Market power scenarios 3 and 4 start with a competitive investment market at the end of
period 1, and then proceed with a competitive energy market for scenario 3, and a duopoly
energy market for scenario 4. In the competitive investment market, firms assume that
their capacity investments have no effect on energy market prices in period 2, therefore
they take energy market prices in period 2 to be fixed. I make the assumption that the
firms have rational expectations for energy market prices in period 2. This means that the
price they expect is the final market outcome after all the investments have been made. In
scenario 3, the actual period 2 prices will be determined after firms have already made their
investments and produce at the competitive level. In scenario 4, the actual period 2 prices
will be determined after firms make their investments and then compete in a Cournot game
in the energy market.
In the energy market, competitive equilibrium is determined by where supply crosses demand in each of the four regions, and duopoly equilibrium is determined as the symmetric
Cournot equilibrium in each of the four regions. Since demand in each region is estimated
based on price, this may lead to endogeneity concerns when equilibrium price changes with
additional capacity. In the counterfactual simulations, demand in each region remain fixed
as investment changes. Even though in the estimation procedure each level of demand is
defined based on price, in the counterfactual simulations demand in each region is four fixed
linear equations. Therefore, demand functions in the counterfactual simulations are not defined based on price. Holding these four demands constant throughout the simulation, I
solve for a new equilibrium in the energy market for every level of new investment. As
investment increases, there is no guarantee that demand or marginal revenue will continue
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to cross the vertical section of the supply curve for region-3 and region-4 demand. When the
supply curve continues to shift right, at some point the demand curve will cross the supply
below capacity. I am able to account for this change in equilibrium quantity and price in
the energy market by solving for a new energy market equilibrium under every investment
level within the simulation.

2.8.2. Region-4 Demand Hours
The reason for ERCOT to have a high price cap at $9,000 per MWh is to provide firms with
capacity investment incentives coming from extreme-peak demand hours, which are represented by region-4 hours in this analysis. The level of investment for all four market power
scenarios is simulated for a range of region-4 demand hours from 0 to 100 in increments of
10 hours. The focus on the number of region-4 hours is essential in this context because the
number of region-4 hours has a significant impact on capacity investment incentives. There
are two reasons for this. First, these hours are highly profitable for firms as prices increase
into the thousands per MWh. Second, the high level of demand also means that firms are
producing at capacity. These two reasons combine to imply that during these hours, firms
are selling electricity both at a very high price and a very high quantity. The extreme-peak
demand during region-4 hours also means that all additional investments will be producing at capacity during these hours so there is a one-to-one increase in quantity sold and
capacity investment. Therefore, during these hours additional capacity can potentially be
more profitable as it leads to higher sales. This is not the case during non-region-4 hours
because Table 8 shows that quantity sold during these hours in period 1 already falls short
of capacity, especially in markets with imperfect competition. Any additional capacity investments will not lead to a significant increase in quantity sold for the lower regions, thus
limiting the incentive to increase capacity from these non-region-4 demand hours.
I estimate region-4 demand hours from hours in the data where the price per MWh exceeds
$500. In the simulation, the demand in each of the four regions is fixed. I solve equilibrium
quantity in the energy market by finding the competitive or duopoly energy market equi100

Table 9: Region-4 Hours
Year
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Average

Region-4 Hours
61
9
1
6
10
0
0
30
59
20

Note: Region-4 demand is estimated from hours in the ERCOT’s DAM dataset when the price per
MWh is above $500.

librium for every level of investment. Table 9 summarizes the number of region-4 demand
hours from 2011 to 2019. The number of region-4 demand hours varies highly year to year.
I account for this variation by simulating a range of region-4 hours from 0 to 100. For a
given number of region-4 hours in my simulation, firms assume this will be fixed for infinite
periods into the future. If the simulation is for 20 region-4 hours, then firms will assume
that there will be 20 region-4 hours for all future periods with certainty.

2.8.3. Capacity Investment and Welfare Simulation Results
Figure 24 and Table 18 summarize capacity investment levels under all four market power
scenarios for the range of region-4 hours. As the number of region-4 hours increases, firms
under all four market power scenarios increase their investment levels. This is because as
the number of region-4 hours increases, the number of hours that firms can earn a high
profit from their capacity investments also increases. Therefore, they are incentivized to
invest in more capacity.
For each market power scenario in the energy market, investment is higher when the investment market is competitive. The reason for this is that when firms increase their capacity,
energy market prices decrease as the additional capacity with lower marginal cost shifts the
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Figure 24: Capacity Investment under 4 Market Power Scenarios

Note: This graph shows the increase in capacity investment for one firm as the number of region-4
hours increases from 0 to 100. Each line represents a different market power scenario. Market power
in the energy market is either competitive or duopoly. Market power in the investment market is
either competitive or strategic.

Table 10: Investment per Firm under 4 Market Power Scenarios
Region-4
Hours
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

Investment per Firm in MW
ICEC ISEC ICED ISED
0
0
0
0
390
4
221
164
1,085
684
1,573 1,179
1,731 1,296 1,653 1,493
2,381 1,816 1,920 1,667
2,908 2,392 2,387 2,076
3,335 2,565 3,054 2,618
3,754 2,718 4,016 3,200
4,351 2,936 4,314 3,710
4,974 3,096 4,800 4,283
5,588 3,229 5,462 4,765

Note: This table presents the investment levels per firm from Figure 24. ICEC, ISEC, ICED, ISED
refer to the four different market power scenarios. They are respectively: investment competitive, energy competitive; investment strategic, energy competitive; investment competitive, energy
duopoly; investment strategic, energy duopoly. Investment level is capacity investment in MW per
firm. There are two symmetric firms in the model, so total investment in the strategic market is
investment per firm multiplied by two.
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entire marginal cost curve to the right. When the investment market is competitive, firms
are not taking into account this decrease in energy market prices, instead taking them to
be fixed with rational expectations, believing that the additional capacity will not have an
effect on period 2 energy market prices. This leads firms in the competitive investment
market to invest more than they would in the strategic investment market. This result
comparing competitive and strategic investment markets is consistent with the results from
the theory chapter. The incentives for investment are precisely analyzed in the theory chapter, which shows that firms impacted by decreases in energy market prices from additional
capacity are less incentivized to invest.
Within each competitive or strategic investment market, the effect of market power on
investment in the energy market is less clear. The lines in Figure 24 for duopoly and
competitive energy markets cross at points. The competitive energy market has a higher
investment level from 30 to 60 region-4 hours. Investment from the duopoly energy market
exceeds or equals the competitive energy market around 20 region-4 hours and above 60
region-4 hours. This implies that a duopoly energy market can potentially end up with
a higher total capacity level than a competitive energy market. This result is perhaps
intuitively surprising as firms in a duopoly energy market are expected to withhold their
production and underinvest.
We know from the theory chapter that the overall incentive for investment comes from
the summation of expected investment incentives across all hours over the lifetime of the
investment. In this simulation, each region of demand contributes to the overall incentive for
investment. The incentive for investment from region-4 is the same across all market power
scenarios in the energy market. In Figure 25, both the demand curve and the marginal
revenue curve cross the vertical supply curve at capacity even when additional capacity
exceeds 10,000 MW. Within the range of region-4 demand hours in this model, duopoly
firms in the energy market will not strategically withhold. This means that the behaviors
of duopoly firms and competitive firms during region-4 hours are the same as firms in both
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Figure 25: Region-4 Demand and Marginal Revenue

Note: This graph shows the demand and marginal revenue curves for region-4. Both curves will
cross the vertical part of the supply curve at capacity even as capacity increases by 10,000 MW and
beyond.

scenarios will produce at capacity. Therefore, the marginal increase in profits in region-4
from additional capacity is the same for competitive and duopoly firms. This implies that
the differences in investment levels between the competitive and the duopoly energy markets
are due to differences in investment incentives from regions 1-3.
Marginal increases in profit from additional capacity are different between duopoly and
competitive energy markets in the non-region-4 regions because the duopoly firms will
strategically withhold. We know from the theory chapter that during lower demand hours,
additional capacity can either increase or decrease profits depending on where the demand
crosses the supply curve. Competitive firms may see a greater increase in profit from
additional capacity relative to the duopoly because the demand curve is crossing the supply
curve at a different point than the marginal revenue curve. In these instances, we will see
a higher level of investment from the competitive energy market. At other points along
the supply curve when prices decrease from additional capacity, duopoly firms have the
advantage of maintaining higher prices due to strategic withholding while competitive firms
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may experience a much more significant profit decrease. We can see this effect in Figure 24
when the number of region-4 hours is above 60 in the strategic investment scenario. The
gap in investment levels between the duopoly and the competitive energy markets is due
to the profit decreases during non-region-4 demand hours for the competitive firm. A more
detailed breakdown of investment incentives for duopoly firms and competitive firms in the
energy market is given in the next section.
Table 11 summarizes the profit and welfare results under each market power scenario with
the baseline of 100 being the competitive energy market and competitive investment market
which has the highest welfare. The welfare figures are calculated by integrating the area
between the marginal cost curve and the demand curve up to the equilibrium quantity in
each of the four demand regions. Hourly profit and welfare calculations from each market are
summed up according to the numbers of hours of occurrences in a year, and then discounted
from infinite periods into period 2 by

β
1−β .

Finally, investment costs are subtracted from

the discounted profit and total welfare.
Total welfare is the highest for the competitive energy and competitive investment scenario.
Welfare is slightly lower for the competitive energy and strategic investment scenario, but
profit for each firm is higher when they take into account the effect of capacity investment
on energy prices in period 2. Welfare in the scenarios with a duopoly energy market is
lower. This is due to the duopoly firms withholding supply during non-region-4 demand
hours. However, in the context of capacity adequacy, the primary concern is the market’s
capacity level during region-4 hours when firms are all producing at full capacity. The
results here suggest that during hours when all firms are producing at capacity, it is not
the case that a competitive energy market will lead to higher investment levels.

2.8.4. A Breakdown of Investment Incentives
When firms are thinking about capacity investments strategically, they weigh the potential
profits from the added capacity against the cost of the capacity investments. Since the cost
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Table 11: Profit and Welfare under 4 Market Power Scenarios
Region-4
Hours
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

ICEC
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

Profits per Firm
ISEC ICED
100
494.1
102.2 254.9
100.7 190.0
100.6 165.0
100.9 150.8
101.5 142.3
102.7 137.1
103.5 132.8
103.1 129.2
102.7 126.2
102.5 123.5

ISED
494.1
254.9
192.3
165.5
151.2
142.6
137.4
133.6
129.8
126.6
124.1

ICEC
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

Total Welfare
ISEC ICED
100
90.3
99.9
91.8
99.9
93.2
99.9
94.3
99.9
94.9
99.9
95.3
99.8
95.7
99.7
96.2
99.5
96.6
99.3
97.0
99.0
97.3

ISED
90.3
91.8
93.2
94.3
94.9
95.3
95.7
96.1
96.5
96.9
97.2

Note: ICEC, ISEC, ICED, ISED refer to the four different market power scenarios. They are respectively: investment competitive, energy competitive; investment strategic, energy competitive;
investment competitive, energy duopoly; investment strategic, energy duopoly. ICEC has the baseline measure of 100 for profit and welfare.

of capacity investments for this model is assumed to be the same for all firms, differences
in investment levels come from the impact of additional capacity on profits in period 2. We
have already seen in the previous section that the profits during region-4 demand hours
for any additional capacity investments are the same for duopoly and competitive firms
because they will all produce at capacity. This is not the case for non-region-4 demand
hours because firms in the duopoly energy markets will strategically withhold capacity.
During these hours, any additional capacity, by changing the marginal cost function, will
impact profits differently depending on the type of firm and the market power scenario.
From the theory chapter, we know that additional capacity can impact a firm’s profits from
lower demand hours in three ways: increasing the quantity sold, lowering the market price,
and lowering the cost. Additional capacity investments have a lower marginal cost and will
shift the marginal cost curve to the right, causing the marginal cost curve to cross a lower
point on the demand curve. This increases the quantity, lowers the price, and lowers the
average cost. The magnitude of these changes is sensitive to the location and curvature on
the marginal cost curve and where it crosses the demand or marginal revenue curve. If the
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Figure 26: Demand and Marginal Revenue with Additional Capacity

Note: This graph shows the change in where demand and marginal revenue cross the supply curve
as capacity investment increases and the supply curve shifts to the right. Demand and marginal
revenue from the above $500 price range is not shown in the graph because they cross the supply
curve much higher up the vertical capacity constraint.

demand curve crosses the vertical part of the marginal cost curve, such as during region-4
hours, then there will be a one-to-one increase between additional capacity and quantity
sold. If the demand curve crosses a flat part of the marginal cost curve, then there will be
no change in quantity sold with increases in capacity. Also to note is that the marginal
revenue curve is always steeper than the demand curve, so the increase in quantity per
additional capacity will always be lower for the duopoly than for the competitive firm if
marginal revenue crosses any non-vertical locations on the marginal cost curve.
Figure 26 shows the demand and marginal revenue curves from regions 1-3 crossing the
supply curve before and after 10,000 MW of additional capacity. We can see that as the
supply curve shifts right with additional capacity, the equilibrium price and quantity in
each region will change. The change in equilibrium price and quantity, and therefore profit,
is different between a competitive firm and a duopoly firm because the demand curve and
the marginal revenue curve are crossing the supply curve at different points.
Figures 27 and 28 show the changes in profit for competitive and duopoly firms in the four
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Figure 27: Competitive Firm Changes in Profit with Capacity Increase

Note: This graph shows the changes in profit in each demand region as capacity increases for a
competitive firm. The profit in each demand region before capacity increase is normalized to 1. The
only demand region where a competitive firm sees consistent increase in profit is during the highest
level of demand.

regions when capacity increases. The profit in each region when additional investment is
equal to zero is normalized to 1, and the figures show how profits in each region increase or
decrease as capacity increases. For the competitive firm, profits decrease in both regions-2
and-3 and increase in region-4. Profits fluctuate dramatically in region-1, but the market
price in this flat region of the marginal cost function is very close to marginal cost, so total
profit from this region is very low, less than 1% of total annual profit for higher numbers
of region-4 hours. Therefore, competitive firms only benefit from additional capacity in
region-4. The duopoly firm also only benefits from additional capacity in region-4. However,
the profits for the duopoly firm in the other three regions remain relatively constant with
increases in capacity. This implies that competitive firms are actually more disincentivized
to invest in regions-2 and-3 relative to the duopoly.
This result may seem counter-intuitive because the duopoly firm is withholding production
in these two regions while the competitive firm is producing at the higher quantity in
region-2 and producing at capacity in region-3. The reason for this decrease in profit
for the competitive firm is due to the decrease in price in these two regions as capacity
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Figure 28: Duopoly Firm Changes in Profit with Capacity Increase

Note: This graph shows the changes in profit in each demand region as capacity increases for a
duopoly firm. The profit in each demand region before capacity increase is normalized to 1. The
duopoly experiences less profit decrease in regions 1-3 relative to the competitive firm due to its
ability to maintain prices through strategic withholding.

increases. This is even true in region-3 when the competitive firm is producing at capacity.
The decrease in price more than offsets the increase in quantity. Figure 29 shows the
changes in prices in both regions when capacity increases. The duopoly can maintain a
more constant price as capacity increases by withholding production, where in these two
regions the marginal revenue curve crosses the marginal cost curve at a flatter section than
the demand curve.
In region-4, profits for competitive and duopoly firms remain the same as capacity increases.
This is because firms are all producing at capacity regardless of the market power scenario.
Since this is the only region that positively incentivizes capacity investment, the result from
this analysis is evidence that market power in the energy market does not have a significant
effect on capacity investment decisions if the firms are investing strategically. The level
of investment will depend on the number of hours where demand crosses the supply curve
in region-4. If this is expected to occur more frequently, both the competitive firm and
the duopoly firm will find it profitable to invest in more capacity. However, if there are
also more hours in regions-2-and-3, the competitive firm may become more disincentivized
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Figure 29: Price Change with Capacity Increase in Regions-2-and-3

Note: This graph compares the change in prices between a competitive and duopoly firm in demand regions-2-and -3 as capacity increases. The duopoly maintains higher prices through strategic
withholding.

to invest relative to the duopoly firm due to the competitive firm’s sensitivity to price
decreases in these two regions. The aggregate effect on investment decisions will depend
on the distribution of these varying demands as firms weigh the increases and decreases on
total profit from additional capacity.

2.8.5. Price Caps
The previous section makes the argument that the incentive to invest in additional capacity
primarily comes from high price hours where the demand function crosses the marginal
cost function in region-4. Results from the theory chapter show that when a price cap is
introduced that lowers scarcity prices during extreme-peak demand hours, the incentive to
invest in additional capacity will also decrease. Figure 30 shows the effect of different types
of price caps on the investment decisions for a duopoly firm making strategic investment
decisions. The blue large dotted line shows the investment level when a $900 price cap
is introduced. This lowers the price during region-4 hours from over $1,200 to $900. The
effect of this price cap is a decrease in investment level across the range of region-4 hours.
The red small dotted line in Figure 30 introduces additional price caps during regions 1110

Figure 30: Investment Comparison for Various Price Caps

Note: This graphs compares the investment levels for a duopoly firm under various types of price
caps. A price cap at $900 will lower scarcity rents during region-4 hours and decrease capacity
investment.

3 that are equal to the competitive price in period 1. An interesting observation here is
that under the $900 region-4 price cap, investment level is higher with the inclusion of the
competitive price caps in regions 1-3. This is because under the competitive price caps,
prices during regions 1-3 demand hours are constant with additional capacity. However,
prices during these hours without the price cap may decrease with additional capacity. Price
caps in the regions 1-3 demand hours essentially make the investment market competitive
because market prices do not change based on the duopoly’s investment decisions. When
the demand curve crosses the supply curve at the non-vertical regions, we have seen in the
previous section that these hours do not significantly incentivize additional capacity for the
duopoly firm. Having a price cap during regions 1-3 demand hours essentially fixes the
profit during these hours for the duopoly firm as capacity increases. The duopoly firm is
still incentivized to invest in more capacity from the profit increases during region-4 hours,
but it is not disincentivized from profit decreases during regions 1-3 demand hours as the
profits during these hours are fixed by the price cap.
Table 12 presents the profit and welfare measures in the duopoly energy market under
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Table 12: Duopoly Profit and Welfare Under Price Caps
Region-4
Hours
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

Profits per Firm
No Cap $900
Comp
7,049
7,049
1,417
9,505
8,736
3,046
11,887 10,408 4,764
14,379 12,063 6,519
16,951 13,810 8,312
19,546 15,595 10,139
22,186 17,408 12,007
24,866 19,243 13,905
27,598 21,123 15,834
30,348 23,033 17,785
33,167 24,970 19,758

Total Welfare
No Cap $900
Comp
27,227 27,227 30,282
32,507 32,498 35,431
38,011 37,947 40,806
43,648 43,601 46,332
49,310 49,268 51,986
55,051 54,962 57,782
60,917 60,720 63,732
66,941 66,709 69,745
73,095 72,716 75,837
79,418 78,936 81,983
85,820 85,383 88,244

Note: This table presents the profit and welfare measures in the duopoly energy market under two
different price caps. The first price cap is a $900 price cap. The second price cap is a $900 price cap
with additional price caps during regions 1-3 demand hours that are equal to the competitive price
in period 1.

the two price caps. Price caps decrease profits for the duopoly because the $900 price
cap reduces scarcity rents during region-4 demand hours and the competitive price caps
decrease the duopoly’s profits during regions 1-3 demand hours. Welfare decreases under
the $900 price cap but increases under the competitive price cap as the duopoly is forced
to produce at competitive levels. However, in practice price caps are set at a uniform level
across all hours, therefore it is likely to decrease welfare as in the case of the $900 price
cap in this simulation. Price caps also leads to excess demand. In this scenario, region-4
demand at $900 is 132,524 MWh, which far exceeds the available capacity. Even at 100
region-4 hours, total capacity in the market after all investments will be less than 60,000
MW. The excess demand under the price cap will lead to blackouts on the grid. In order to
maintain capacity adequacy under a price cap, many electricity markets create a separate
capacity market that pays firms for providing a set quantity of generation capacity. The
interaction between market power and capacity markets is explored in detail in the theory
chapter.
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2.9. Conclusion
In this chapter, I analyze the interaction between capacity investment and market power in
the electricity market. I model the presence of market power in two aspects of the electricity
market: the capacity investment market, and the electricity generation market. I show that
when firms behave strategically in the investment market, capacity investment will be lower
relative to a competitive investment market. This is because in a strategic investment
market, firms consider the decrease in energy market prices from additional capacity, while
in a competitive investment market firms take energy market prices to be fixed so that they
do not control the downsides from additional capacity. In the energy market, I show that
market power does not have a considerable effect on investment outcomes; especially that
market power in the energy market does not lower the level of investment. This is because
the incentive for capacity investment comes primarily from extreme-peak demand hours in
region-4 when firms are producing at capacity regardless of market power. When the number
of region-4 demand hours increases, the incentive for capacity investment will significantly
increase. During non-region-4 demand hours, market power in the energy market does have
an effect on investment incentives. I show that due to strategic withholding, firms with
market power are able to maintain prices during regions 1-3 demand hours when capacity
increases, while firms in a competitive market will experience sharper price decreases. This
means that competitive firms face a stronger disincentive to invest from regions 1-3 demand
hours relative to firms with market power.
A major takeaway from this paper is that market power in the energy market will affect
investment incentives differently depending on the level of demand. I analyze this using
discrete and fixed levels of demand in my model. This approach is sufficient to show the
various possible ways in which market power affects investment outcomes, but the downside
is that it can only provide an approximate estimate of the total effect across all levels of
demand. An important next step is to consider the entire continuous distribution of demand
levels and show how the changes in the expectation of this distribution of demand will
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interact with market power and affect capacity investment.
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APPENDIX
A1: A Price Cap that Increases Investment
For any price cap P̄ set between the market price and the marginal increase in revenue at
the optimal investment level x∗i , the marginal increase in revenue under the price cap will
be higher, leading to higher investment:

a − K − x∗i
a − K − 2x∗i − δi K
< P̄ <
b
b

(A.1)

If the price cap in an investment market with no entrants is set to equal the marginal
increase in total cost in equilibrium from a market with fringe entrants (which is above the
marginal increase in revenue for the monopoly), then the investment level in the investment
market with no entrants can increase to a level that results in higher total welfare. This
level of price cap is much higher than the typical price cap levels in practice, but it is
theoretically possible to increase investment incentives from this type of a price cap.
Price caps set between the marginal increase in revenue and the market price at the optimal
investment level can also create excess demand. Whether excess demand exists in this case
will depend on the slope and curvature of the investment cost function. At this price cap
range, investment will increase from the optimal level without the price cap. The question
is whether the increase in investment will be enough to cover the increase in demand from
the price cap or how P (x̄) compares with P̄ .
The difference between P (x̄) and P (x∗i ) is given by

a−K−x∗i
b

−

a−K−x̄
b

=

1
b (x̄

− x∗i ). The

dR
difference between P̄ and P (x∗i ) is equal to P (x∗i )−(P̄ − dx
(x∗i )), where P̄ is between P (x∗i )
i

and

dR
∗
dxi (xi ).

0

0

dR
We also know that (P̄ − dx
(x∗i )) = Ii (x̄) − Ii (x∗i ). So the distance between P̄
i

and P (x∗i ) is equal to:

a−K−x∗i
b

0

0

− Ii (x̄) + Ii (x∗i ).

For a fixed P̄ , x̄ can result in a range of values depending on the slope of the investment
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0

function Ii (x). If the slope is gradual, then x̄ can be large. However, due to the curvature
0

0

of the investment cost function, the difference in investment cost function Ii (x̄) − Ii (x∗i ) has
to always be greater than the difference between the linear marginal revenue

dR
dxi

between

the two investment levels. This bound is given by 2b (x̄ − x∗i ). This means that the distance
between the price cap and

dR
∗
dxi (xi )

has to always be more than twice bigger than the dif-

ference between P (x̄) and P (x∗i ). This means that for the price cap close to the marginal
revenue, price cap will be lower than the market price at x̄. However, when the price cap
is higher and more than two thirds of the distance toward P (x∗i ), then the two prices will
cross and the price cap will be higher than the actual price. The exact quantity will depend
on the slope of the investment function. The higher the slope, the higher the cap has to be
before it is above P (x̄). The point where P (x̄) and P (x∗i ) cross will be a price cap that will
increase investment level without creating excess demand.

A2: Tables and Figures from Counterfactual Simulations
Table 13: Profit and Welfare under 4 Market Power Scenarios in Millions
Region-4
Hours
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

ICEC
1,427
3,729
6,182
8,686
11,215
13,710
16,143
18,609
21,261
23,976
26,737

Profits per Firm
ISEC
ICED
1,427
7,049
3,812
9,503
6,225
11,745
8,742
14,335
11,311 16,916
13,909 19,513
16,580 22,129
19,262 24,707
21,928 27,479
24,6187 30,254
27,407 33,033

ISED
7,049
9,505
11,887
14,379
16,951
19,546
22,186
24,866
27,598
30,348
33,167

ICEC
30,154
35,398
40,778
46,302
51,964
57,757
63,654
69,633
75,714
81,921
88,259

Total Welfare
ISEC ICED
30,154 27,227
35,368 32,508
40,757 38,018
46,278 43,653
51,923 49,310
57,717 55,064
63,529 60,942
69,397 66,971
75,364 73,172
81,358 79,467
87,378 85,889

ISED
27,227
32,507
38,011
43,648
49,310
55,051
60,917
66,941
73,095
79,418
85,820

Note: ICEC, ISEC, ICED, ISED refer to the four different market power scenarios. They are
respectively: investment competitive, energy competitive; investment strategic, energy competitive;
investment competitive, energy duopoly; investment strategic, energy duopoly.
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Figure 31: Changes in Quantity with Capacity Increase in Region-1

Note: This graph shows the changes in equilibrium quantity for the competitive and duopoly markets
in region-1.

Figure 32: Changes in Quantity with Capacity Increase in Region-2

Note: This graph shows the changes in equilibrium quantity for the competitive and duopoly markets
in region-2.
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Figure 33: Changes in Quantity with Capacity Increase in Region-3

Note: This graph shows the changes in equilibrium quantity for the competitive and duopoly markets
in region-3.

Figure 34: Changes in Quantity with Capacity Increase in Region-4

Note: This graph shows the changes in equilibrium quantity for the competitive and duopoly markets
in region-4.
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Figure 35: Changes in Price with Capacity Increase in Region-1

Note: This graph shows the changes in equilibrium price for the competitive and duopoly markets
in region-1.

Figure 36: Changes in Price with Capacity Increase in Region-2

Note: This graph shows the changes in equilibrium price for the competitive and duopoly markets
in region-2.
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Figure 37: Changes in Price with Capacity Increase in Region-3

Note: This graph shows the changes in equilibrium price for the competitive and duopoly markets
in region-3.

Figure 38: Changes in Price with Capacity Increase in Region-4

Note: This graph shows the changes in equilibrium price for the competitive and duopoly markets
in region-4.
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Table 14: Percent Profit for Each Region ICEC
Region-4
Hours
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

Percent of Total
R1 R2 R3
27
7
65
10
3
24
7
1
14
6
1
9
5
0
7
4
0
5
2
0
5
1
0
4
1
0
3
1
0
3
1
0
2

Profit
R4
0
64
78
84
87
90
93
95
96
97
97

Note: This table presents the percentage of total profits for the ICEC market power scenario from
each of the four regions as region-4 hours increase.

Table 15: Percent Profit for Each Region ISEC
Region-4
Hours
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

Percent of Total
R1 R2 R3
27
7
65
10
3
24
6
2
14
6
1
10
5
1
7
4
0
6
4
0
5
3
0
4
3
0
4
2
0
3
2
0
3

Profit
R4
0
63
78
84
87
90
91
93
94
95
95

Note: This table presents the percentage of total profits for the ISEC market power scenario from
each of the four regions as region-4 hours increase.
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Table 16: Percent Profit for Each Region ICED
Region-4
Hours
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

Percent of Total
R1 R2 R3
83
4
13
61
3
10
48
2
8
39
2
6
33
2
5
29
1
5
25
1
4
22
1
4
20
1
3
18
1
3
16
1
3

Profit
R4
0
26
42
52
60
65
70
73
76
79
81

Note: This table presents the percentage of total profits for the ICED market power scenario from
each of the four regions as region-4 hours increase.

Table 17: Percent Profit for Each Region ISED
Region-4
Hours
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

Percent of Total
R1 R2 R3
83
4
13
61
3
10
48
2
8
40
2
6
34
2
5
29
1
5
25
1
4
22
1
4
20
1
3
18
1
3
16
1
3

Profit
R4
0
26
42
52
59
65
69
73
76
78
80

Note: This table presents the percentage of total profits for the ISED market power scenario from
each of the four regions as region-4 hours increase.
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Table 18: Investment per Firm under Different Price Caps
Region-4
Hours
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

Investment per Firm in MW
No Cap $900
Comp
0
0
0
164
7
114
1,179
786
471
1,493
1,301
958
1,667
1,493
1,403
2,076
1,646
1,879
2,618
1,866
2,388
3,200
2,388
2,754
3,710
2,713
3,067
4,283
3,184
3,326
4,765
3,786
3,647

Note: This table presents the investment levels per firm in the duopoly energy market under two
different price caps. The first price cap is a $900 price cap. The second price cap is a $900 price cap
with additional price caps during regions 1-3 demand hours that are equal to the competitive price
in period 1. These investment levels are presented in Figure 30.
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